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The regime of islands, as captured in Article 121 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea (LOSC) grants a 200 nautical mile exclusive economic zone and continental shelf to all 
islands apart from “rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own.” 
The provision was undoubtedly drafted in an intentionally ambiguous manner in order to strike a 
compromise between the contrasting views of States surrounding the regime of islands. 
Consequently, Article 121 is riddled with textual ambiguities. For example, the text does not 
further define the word “rock”; nor does the provision explain what it means to “sustain human 
habitation or economic life”. 
 
As a result of these ambiguities, many States are of the opinion that Article 121 allocates a 200 
nautical mile zone to every piece of land that protrudes above water. This provision is problematic 
as it potentially allocates vast amounts of ocean space to nations claiming sovereignty over tiny 
uninhabited islands speckled throughout the oceans, severely limiting the space that remains for 
the “common heritage of mankind”. In addition, the ambiguous wording of Article 121 has resulted 
in various territorial disputes between nations in relation to both the interpretation and application 
of the Article.  
 
This dissertation seeks primarily to investigate whether the international community is moving 
towards certainty on the interpretation of Article 121 of the LOSC, with particular reference to the 
distinction between islands and rocks. In doing so, this dissertation will explore the body of 
jurisprudence of international courts and tribunals insofar as it relates to Article 121 of the LOSC. 
This is a fruitful exercise as any clarification in this regard will undoubtedly unify State practice 
surrounding the application of Article 121. This may have the effect of reducing conflict between 
States and ensuring that ocean spaces around insular formations are apportioned in an equitable 
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Let’s Rock and Roll 
1.1 Background and Context: 
The regime of islands has been an issue of great interest for several decades. Consequently, the 
issue received special attention at the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS III). During the negotiations it became apparent that the nations present had differing 
views on how the regime of islands should be formulated. While certain States were eager to 
reduce the impact of small islands on maritime jurisdiction claims, other States held a vested 
interest in maximising jurisdictional claims from these insular formations.1 After nine arduous 
years of negotiations, a single provision regarding islands was adopted – Article 121 of the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC). The provision reads as follows:2  
 
“Regime of Islands 
 
1. An island is a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at 
high tide. 
2. Except as provided for in paragraph 3, the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the 
exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf of an island are determined in 
accordance with the provisions of this Convention applicable to other land territory.  
3. Rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall have no 
exclusive economic zone or continental shelf.3” 
 
Article 121 provides rules for the recognition of islands in addition to the maritime space that may 
be generated by islands. However, Article 121 has done little to eradicate the complexity and 
                                                                 
1 For a comprehensive overview of the drafting history of Article 121 and the differing interests of the Sates present 
at the negotiations see R.D. Hodgson & R.W. Smith, “The Informal Single Negotiation Text (Committee II): A 
Geographical Perspective,” Ocean Development and International Law, Vol. 3, 1976. 
2  U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/122, (1982), United Nations, Official Text of the United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea with Annexes and Index. It is recognized that this treaty goes by a number of different acronyms, “LOSC” 
(as above), “UNCLOS” (United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea) or, by its opponents, “LOST” (Law of the 
Sea Treaty). LOSC is preferred to UNCLOS in order to avoid confusion with the three United Nations Conferences 
on the Law of the Sea of 1958 (resul ting in the four Conventions), 1960 and 1974-1982 (resulting in LOSC). The 
terms “UNCLOS I”, “UNCLOS II”, and “UNCLOS III” are used to refer to the three United Nations Conferences on the 
Law of the Sea. 
3 Article 121 of the LOSC. 
5 
 
problems surrounding insular formations. At its core, Article 121 strikes a compromise between 
the divergent interests of the States present at UNCLOS III. Thus, there is little doubt that the text 
of Article 121, and in particular paragraph 3, was designed to be intentionally ambiguous.4 
Ultimately, Article 121 comprises of lowest common denominator language to which States with 
vastly different interests would assent.5 As the text of Article 121 is designed to be interpreted in 
a variety of ways, many critical issues regarding insular formations remain to be settled. An 
assessment of the impact of article 121(3) of the LOSC on the extent of maritime zones is 
seriously hampered by the fact that it has raised a number of complex issues of interpretation.6 
These concerns include, inter alia, what size leads to the classification of an island as a rock, and 
what qualifies as “human habitation”, “economic life” or “of their own.” These questions have 
attracted significant scholarly attention, emphasising the intricacies involved in answering them. 
 
Arguably, the most complex issue of interpretation is distinguishing between different types of 
insular formations. In particular it is necessary to discern what constitutes an “island”, which is 
capable of generating extended maritime claims (an exclusive economic zone [EEZ] and 
continental shelf), and what constitutes a “rock” which is incapable of generating such claims. 
This distinction is of great importance as islands autonomously generate the full package of 
maritime jurisdictional zones offered under the LOSC7, whereas rocks are only entitled to 
generate a 12 nm territorial sea and a 24 nm contiguous zone.8 Consequently, even minute 
islands – insofar as they exist - have the potential to generate massive maritime jurisdictional 
zones with significant security/resource implications.  
 
To put things in perspective, if an island has no maritime neighbours within 400 nm, it may 
generate 125,664 sq.nm (431,014km²) of territorial sea, EEZ and continental shelf rights. In stark 
contrast, a mere rock, incapable of generating EEZ and continental shelf rights, may only 
generate a territorial sea of 452 sq.nm (1,550km²).9 Not only does the status of an insular feature 
have enormous consequences in terms of the scope of the maritime claims that can be made, it 
                                                                 
4 C.H. Schofield, “The Trouble with Islands” A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the 
degree of Master’s in law (The University of British Columbia, 2009) at 88. 
5 Ibid. 
6 A.G.O. Elferink, “Clarifying Article 121(3) of the Law of the Sea Convention: The Limits Set by the Nature of 
International Legal Processes ,” IBRU Boundary and Security Bulletin, 1998 at 58. 
7 In accordance with Article 121(2) of the LOSC. 
8 In accordance with Article 121(3) of the LOSC. 
9 C.H. Schofield op cit note 4. It should be noted that these theoretical calculations assume that the island or rock 
in question has no area. As such features inevitably comprise some territory and therefore area, the potential 
maritime claims that can be generated from them are likely to be greater. 
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also has an impact on the role of such features in maritime boundary delimitation.10 As a result, it 
is not surprising that almost all States with sovereignty over insular formations have taken the 
position that their insular formations are islands and are thus capable of generating an EEZ and 
continental shelf.11 Over the past few years, many nations have bolstered their claims to insular 
formations, emphasising the importance of clarifying Article 121.12  
 
The practical effect of the ambiguous text of Article 121 was acutely seen when the United 
Kingdom claimed Rockall, a barren and windswept rock structure that protrudes out of the rough 
ocean northwest of the British Isles, as an island. The United Kingdom used Rockall to define its 
200 nm fishery zone limit in 1977, but encountered strong opposition from Denmark, Iceland and 
Ireland who objected to Rockall being used as a basepoint for the United Kingdom’s fishery zone 
as Rockall was, in their view, an Article 121(3) rock.13 Subsequently the United Kingdom acceded 
to Rockall’s classification as a rock and relinquished around 60 000 square nm of its previously 
claimed fishery zone.14  Currently the small Paracel and Spratly Islands in the South China Sea 
are in active dispute amongst Vietnam, China, Taiwan and the Philippines as the status of these 
insular features will determine the maritime jurisdictional zones which may be claimed and 
subsequently who has jurisdiction over nearby underwater petroleum.15 The very recent South 
China Sea Arbitration16, the first instance of international jurisprudence which engages 
meaningfully with an interpretation of Article 121, deals with this issue in detail and the extent to 
which the judgement of the Tribunal has clarified the interpretational issues surrounding Article 
121 will be explored in detail in chapter 5.  Furthermore, Japan has spent millions of dollars in an 
attempt to develop Okinotorishima, two minute and uninhabited insular formations in the Western 
Pacific Ocean, in order to classify the formations as islands and claim a 200 nm EEZ around the 
features. However, China has objected to such classification and asserts that Okinotorishima are 
                                                                 
10 Ibid at 74. 
11 Ibid.  
12 Ibid. 
13 D.H. Anderson, “British Accession to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea,” International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly, Vol. 46, 1997 at 761-786. 
14 The United Kingdom’s 200nm fishery zone limit was instead “rolled-back” to a l imit measured from basepoints 
located on the Outer Hebrides group of islands fringing the Scottish mainland coast. 
15 For more on the status of insular features in the South China Sea see A.G.O. Elferink, “The Islands in the South 
China Sea: How Does Their Presence Limit the Extent of the High Seas and the Area and the Maritime Zones of the 
Mainland Coasts,” Ocean Development and International Law, Vol. 32, 2001; B.H. Dubner, “The Spratly ‘Rocks’ 
Dispute – A ‘Rockapelago’ Defies Norms of International Law,” Temple International and Comparative Law Journal, 
1995; C. Schofield & D. Wang, “The Regime of Islands Under UNCLOS: Implications for the South China Sea” 
Maritime Energy Resources In Asia: Legal Regimes and Cooperation , 2012. 
16 The South China Sea Arbitration (Philippines v. China), [2016] PCA case No. 2013-19. 
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Article 121(3) rocks. China has repeatedly conducted activities within Japan’s claimed EEZ 
around the features without seeking Japan’s permission, souring diplomacy between the two 
States.17  
 
These are but a few of the many island-related disputes across the globe and it is uncertain how 
many more disputes of this nature will occur in the future. However, what is certain is that insular 
features (even those small, remote, uninhabited and seemingly worthless fly specks on the map) 
have the potential to sour neighbourly relations, leading to military posturing, sabre-rattling and 
gun-boat diplomacy, often leading States to the brink of armed conflict.18 There is little doubt that 
ironing out some of the ambiguities of the regime of islands in Article 121 will do much to resolve 
many island related disputes in the future and unify State practice regarding insular formations. 
However, it remains to be seen if the international community is moving towards a clear 
interpretation of Article 121.  
 
1.2 Purpose and Scope of Dissertation 
 
It is evident from the above that Article 121 of the LOSC is riddled with ambiguities. Although it is 
possible to limit the range of interpretations of the text of Article 121 to a certain degree, literature 
on the subject generally concedes that it is impossible to arrive at an authoritative interpretation 
of Article 121 based on the existing legal materials.19 A recent discussion regarding the regime of 
islands concludes that only State practice and case law will serve to clarify Article 121.20 Thus, 
the practice of States in their application and interpretation of Article 121 and the rulings of 
international courts and tribunals play a pivotal role in clarifying the regime of islands and in 
particular, the distinction between islands and rocks. However, thus far, international 
                                                                 
17 For a detailed discussion of Japan’s claims to Okinotorishima and China’s opposition see L. Diaz, B.H. Dubner and 
J Parent , “When is a “Rock” an “Island” – Another Unilateral Declaration Defies “Norms” of International Law” 
Michigan State University College of Law Journal of International Law, Vol. 15, No. 3, 2007. 
18 Perhaps the most noteworthy military conflict over islands is that between Argentina and the United Kingdom 
over the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas) and South Georgia. Argentina’s occupation of the disputed islands in 1982 
resulted in a conflict which cost the lives of 655 Argentine and 236 British troops. For more on this dispute see, P. 
Armstrong & V. Forbes, “The Falkland Islands and their Adjacent Maritime Area,” Maritime Briefing, Vol. 2, No. 3, 
1997 at 4-12.  
19 A.G.O. Elferink op cit note 6 at 58. 
20 B. Kwiatkowska & A.H.A. Soons “Entitlement to Maritime Areas of Rocks which Cannot Sustain Human 
Habitation or Economic Life of Their Own,” Netherlands Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 21, 1990 at 139-181; 
J.M. Van Dyke, J.R. Morgan and J. Gurish, “The Exclusive Economic Zone of the Northwestern Hawaiian Islands: 
When Do Uninhabited Islands Generate an EEZ?,” San Diego Law Review, Vol. 25, 1988 at 425-494. 
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jurisprudence and State practice have proved largely unhelpful as both international courts and 
tribunals and States have often adeptly side-stepped the issue. Nevertheless, a number of 
developments in the rulings from international courts and tribunals have emerged which give rise 
to prospects for clarification. 
 
Against this backdrop this dissertation seeks to investigate the following question: 
 
Is the international community moving towards certainty on the interpretation of Article 121 of the 
LOSC, with particular reference to the distinction between islands and rocks? 
 
In answering this question, it is necessary to define the parameters of this dissertation. This 
dissertation only deals with insular features insofar as Article 121 of the LOSC is concerned.21 In 
investigating whether the international community is moving towards certainty on the 
interpretation of Article 121 of the LOSC, an analysis of Article 121 will be conducted through a 
consideration of the jurisprudence of international tribunals and courts dealing with the regime of 
islands and in particular the distinction between rocks and islands. Ultimately, this thesis seeks to 
address whether after 25 years since the LOSC came into force, the international community is 
moving towards a uniform interpretation of Article 121 with particular emphasis on the distinction 
between islands and rocks. 
 
1.3 Overview of Structure 
 
In answering this question this dissertation will first provide the general context in which the regime 
of islands is supposed to function (chapter 2).  Chapter 2 will also outline the theoretical 
implications of distinguishing between islands and rocks in the context of Article 121. Examples 
of cases and scenarios where the distinction has been of importance will be provided to illustrate 
that this distinction has real life implications, stressing the need to investigate whether the 
international community is moving towards certainty in this regard. 
 
                                                                 
21 The author is aware that there are two types of insular formations dealt with in the LOSC namely, islands and 
low tide elevations. Article 13 of the LOSC deals specifically with low-tide elevations which differ from islands in 
their zone generative capacity. Generally, low-tide elevations may only constitute a baseline from which to draw 
maritime zones from if they are wholly or partly in the territorial sea of their owning State, unless the low-tide 
elevation constitutes an appropriate fixing point under Article 7(4) of the LOSC. 
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Chapter 3 commences with a brief overview of the drafting history of Article 121. Unfortunately, 
the drafting history of Article 121 does little to assist in ascertaining the intention of the drafters of 
the Article however, it provides some insight into the diversity of views that the regime of islands 
provoked. Ultimately, the drafting history of Article 121 illustrates that the current regime of islands 
was formulated a compromise between the vastly different interests of the States present at the 
negotiations. The implications of Article 121 being drafted in such manner will then be discussed. 
Finally, the elements of Article 121 will be dissected. This will reveal where the ambiguities in the 
text lie.  
 
Chapter 4 will commence with an analysis of relevant jurisprudence of international courts and 
tribunals. In this regard, it must be borne in mind that international courts and tribunals have often 
shied away from delivering a definitive interpretation of Article 121, even when the opportunity 
has arisen. However, there are some exceptions to this trend which give rise to prospects of 
clarifying Article 121. These exceptions will be analysed in order to gauge whether the 
international community is moving towards certainty on its interpretation of Article 121, with 
particular reference to the distinction between islands and rocks. 
 
Chapter 5 will be dedicated to an analysis of the recent South China Sea Arbitration. As this award 
canvasses a variety of issues, only the relevant sections on the Tribunal’s interpretation of the 
regime of islands, as encapsulated in Article 121, will be examined. Ultimately, an exploration of 
the relevant sections of the award will be undertaken in an attempt to reveal whether the South 
China Sea Arbitration has finally contributed towards a clearer interpretation of Article 121 with 
particular reference to the distinction between rocks and islands.  
 
Chapter 6 will provide a succinct summary of what has been canvassed in this dissertation and 
answer the primary research question of this dissertation - Is the international community moving 
towards certainty on the interpretation of Article 121 of UNCLOS, with particular reference to the 
distinction between islands and rocks? Where uncertainty persists, recommendations will be 








Chapter 2  
 Why the fuss? Implications of the distinction between rocks and islands 
2.1 Insular Formations in General 
The world’s oceans are littered with islands.  Islands vary in their origin, size, ecological 
conditions, geographical location and political status. In regard to their geomorphological origin, 
two types of islands exist: continental and oceanic.22 Continental islands are formed from granite, 
gneiss or slate being exposed to sweltering temperatures and severe pressure, whereas mid-
ocean islands are generally volcanic or volcanic-coral in nature.23 Furthermore, some islands may 
also be formed by a specific configuration of the ocean floor and underwater currents and ranges, 
resulting in the sedimentation of organic or mineral matter.24 It has been estimated that there are 
over half a million islands scattered across the globe, canvassing a land area of 3 823 000 square 
miles.25 These islands range from hardly measurable peaks to geomorphological giants such as 
Greenland with an area of over 840 000 square miles.26 They can fringe continents or be 
completely isolated out in the ocean. Islands can exist in isolation or be arranged in clusters of 
various geometrical patterns.  Certain islands may be rich in mineral resources and boast 
abundant fauna and flora, while others may be poor beyond the point of sustaining any form of 
habitation and economic life.27 
Furthermore, the political status of the world’s islands is not uniform.28 Some islands or 
archipelagos form part of archipelagic States. There are nearly fifty archipelagic States, which are 
inhabited by a quarter of the world’s population.29 In contrast, islands may belong to or be 
associated with continental States, they may constitute a trusteeship territory, or remain under 
foreign control or domination despite great advances in decolonisation.30  
                                                                 
22 Islands and their Capacity to Generate Maritime Zones, thesis, University of Oslow, 5. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid. 
25 See R. D. Hodgson, Normal and Special Circumstances in Law of the Sea: The Emerging Regime of the Oceans, 
Proceedings, Law of the Sea Institute, Eight Annual Conference, June 18-21, (1973), ed. by J. K. Gamble, G. 
Pontecorovo, Cambridge Mass (1974) at 139. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid. 
28 F. Moise, “Islands and their Capacity to Generate Maritime Zones ”, thesis, University of Oslow, 2008, at 5. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid at 6. 
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There is an inextricable link between islands and the territory of States. As such the international 
community needed to formulate rules for distinguishing between maritime features and the 
maritime jurisdictional zones that they are capable of generating.   
2.2 The Significance of the Distinction between Rocks and Islands 
Islands are important as they provide a basis for maritime jurisdictional claims in terms of the 
LOSC. There are two main ways in which disputes have arisen regarding islands: sovereignty 
disputes over who owns islands themselves, their land territories and their associated maritime 
zones; and disputes arising over the maritime jurisdictional claims generated by islands and the 
role of a specific insular feature in the bilateral delimitation of maritime boundaries. However, 
these factors are often inextricably linked as the potential role of an island in delimitation and the 
generation of maritime jurisdictional claims can be a pivotal factor in informing and influencing 
disputes over sovereignty.  
Many of these sovereignty disputes involve possession of a handful of remote, barren, small and 
often uninhabited islands, rocks, low-tide elevations and reefs.  Nevertheless, these insular 
features have the ability to prompt fierce diplomatic interactions between States, embitter bilateral 
relations and, in exceptional circumstances, provoke military confrontation.31 
 
Additionally, these disputes need to be viewed in their overall context. Often the history of the 
relationship between the parties to disputes over insular features informs the nature of the 
exchange. Although the territory at stake may be insignificant, the dispute may be representative 
of a pressure point evidencing an already strained or historically antagonistic relationship.32 Often 
it is also the case that a State in possession of disputed insular feature completely denies the 
existence of any dispute on historical grounds, claiming that its sovereignty over the feature is 
                                                                 
31 Perhaps the most noteworthy military conflict over islands is that between Argentina and the United Kingdom 
over the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas) and South Georgia. Argentina’s occupation of the disputed islands in 1982 
resulted in a conflict which cost the lives of 655 Argentine and 236 British troops. See P. Armstrong and V. Forbes 
The Falkland Islands and their Adjacent Maritime Area, Maritime Briefing, Volume 2, No. 3 , (1997) 4-12. Similarly, in 
the “Battle of Fiery Cross Reef” between China and Vietnam in March 1988. In this engagement over possession of 
one of the disputed Spratly Islands 75 Vietnamese personnel were reported to have lost their l ives and three 
Vietnamese ships were set ablaze. Chinese casualties were reported to be slight. See D.J. Dzurek The Spratly Islands: 
Who’s On First?, Maritime Briefing, Vol.2, no.1 , (1996) at 23. 
32 Greece and Turkey’s 1996 confrontation over the small islets of Imia (to Greece) or Kardak Rocks (to Turkey) can 
be seen in this l ight. See M.A. Pratt and C.H. Schofield “The Imia/Kardak Rocks Dispute in the Aegean Sea” Boundary 
and Security Bulletin, Vol.4, No.1 (Spring 1996) 62-69. 
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“indisputable” and established from “time immemorial”, so that there is no room for debate.33 Such 
language has been used recently in the South China Sea disputes, in which China responded to 
submissions to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) by Malaysia and 
Vietnam, by issuing a protest note stating that it had “indisputable sovereignty over the islands in 
the South China Sea”.34  Vietnam responded with a diplomatic note of its own stating that it had 
“indisputable sovereignty” over both the Paracel (Hoang Sa) and Spratly (Truong Sa) Islands.35 
Sovereignty disputes over insular features have proved capable of being resolved, as evidenced 
by a growing number of disputes being settled in recent years, often by means of international 
arbitration or the International Court of Justice (ICJ).36 Examples of such include the international 
arbitration and tribunal decisions resolving the dispute between Eritrea and Yemen concerning 
the sovereignty over the Hanish Islands in 1998 and 1999, the ruling of the ICJ on the dispute 
over the Hawar Islands between Bahrain and Qatar in 2001, as well as the ICJ decision of 2003 
ruling on Indonesia and Malaysia’s dispute over the Sipadan and Ligitan Islands in 2002.37   
However, disputes over sovereignty of insular features have limited relevance to the primary 
research question of this dissertation.  It is the second class of disputes, those concerned with 
the maritime jurisdictional zones associated with islands that truly emphasise the importance of 
clarifying Article 121 of the LOSC and distinguishing between rocks and islands in this context. In 
respect of these disputes surrounding the maritime jurisdictional zones generated by islands, 
Article 121(2) of the LOSC states that islands, in an identical fashion to mainland coasts, are 
capable of generating the full suite of maritime zones: 
“…the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the 
continental shelf of an island are determined in accordance with the provisions of this 
convention applicable to other land territory.”   
                                                                 
33 See Note from the Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China addressed to the Secretary General of the 
United Nations, CML/17/2009, 7 May 2009, available at, 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/submission_mysvnm_33_2009.htm, accessed on 1 
December 2016; Note from the Permanent Mission of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam to the United Nations 
addressed to the Secretary General of the United Nations, 86/HC-2009 available at 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/submission_mysvnm_33_2009.htm, accessed on 1 
December 2016.   
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid. 
36 C.H. Schofield (2009) op cit note 4 at 67  
37 Ibid.  
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On the other hand, Article 121(3) of the LOSC provides that: 
“Rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall have 
no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf.” 
As a result of these provisions, theoretically, even minute islands have the potential capacity to 
generate massive maritime jurisdictional zones. These claims often also have significant resource 
and security implications. To put thing in perspective, if an island has no maritime neighbours 
within a 400 nm radius, it may generate 431,014 km² of territorial sea, EEZ and continental shelf 
rights. However, a mere “rock” with no nearby maritime neighbours may only generate a 
significantly reduced maritime jurisdictional zone of 1,550 km².38 
The problematic issue of distinguishing between “fully-fledged” islands, which are capable of 
generating the full suite of maritime zones, and mere rocks, which are incapable of generating 
such extensive claims, is explored more thoroughly in the next chapter. Indeed, it is clear that the 
distinction between islands and rocks in Article 121 of the LOSC is pivotal in determining the 
potential capacity of an insular feature to act as a basepoint for claiming maritime zones.  This, 
perhaps, explains the significance attached to insular features and the rise in the number of 
international disputes involving insular features. 
States with sovereignty over insular features are, unsurprisingly, eager to claim these formations 
as islands as opposed to mere rocks as the possibility of establishing a full 200 nm EEZ places 
numerous mid-ocean islands in a very advantageous position. The ratio of the area of the island 
to the area of the EEZ is nothing short of impressive. For example, the Cook Islands encompass 
a territory of 94 square miles, but generate a 1.360 thousand square mile EEZ; Nauru canvasses 
a 8.2 square mile territory, but has an EEZ of over 125 thousand square miles; and the Bermuda’s 
occupy a 21 square mile territory, but enjoy a 123 thousand square mile EEZ. The vast maritime 
zones that can be claimed around “fully-fledged” islands present States with the opportunity to 
exploit both living39 and non-living40 resources within them, making the distinction between islands 
                                                                 
38 These theoretical calculations , however, assume that the relevant island or rock in question has no area. As such 
features inevitably comprise some territory and therefore area, the potential mar itime claims that can be generated 
from them are likely to be greater. 
39 S. Arico and C. Salpin ‘Bioprospecting of Genetic Resources in the Deep Seabed: Scientific, Legal and Policy 
Aspects’ UNU-IAS Report (2005) at 17. 
40 Traditionally, seabed hydrocarbon resources (oil and natural gas). It is notable in this context that offshore 
energy resources are becoming increasingly important: it has been estimated that around 60 per cent of global oil  
production now comes from offshore exploitation operations. See, “Offshore oil  and gas around the World”, 
Ministry of Energy, Mines and Petroleum Resources, Government of British Columbia, available at, 
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and rocks an issue of great importance. Furthermore, the distinction between islands and rocks 
can have significant security and strategic dimensions.41 Most notably, fisheries play a significant 
role for food security in coastal States, as well as other living resource opportunities derived from 
marine genetic resources.42 For example, it has been estimated that marine biotechnology related 
products were estimated to be worth US$100 billion in 2000 alone.43 
Another important implication of the distinction between islands and rocks in Article 121 of the 
LOSC relates directly to the area of ocean that falls under the domain of the “high seas” and the 
“common heritage of mankind”. The world’s oceans are currently being divided amongst States 
in multilateral bargaining sessions that have been underway for some time.44 These negotiations 
commenced under the pretense that the wealth of the world’s oceans would be the “common 
heritage” of humankind. However, the LOSC allocates the vast majority of ocean resources to the 
closest coastal States, significantly reducing the area designated for the common heritage of 
mankind and the high seas.  
This issue has been exacerbated as the vast majority of coastal States have, unsurprisingly, 
proved to be eager claimants of maritime jurisdictional zones.45 The majority of coastal States 
claim a 12 nm territorial sea and a 200 nm exclusive economic zone. If every coastal State makes 
a 200 nm maritime jurisdictional claim, it is estimated that these claims would embrace 43 million 
square nautical miles of marine space.46 This constitutes a considerable 41 percent of the area 
of the oceans and 29 percent of the surface area of the Earth.47 Thus, the area subject to maritime 
                                                                 
http://www.empr.gov.bc.ca/OG/offshoreoilandgas/Pages/OffshoreOilandGasAroundtheWorld.as px, accessed on 
29 November 2016. 
41 For example, the proximity of the contested Spratly Islands in the South China Sea to a strategic waterway of 
global significance, providing the key maritime link between the Indian Ocean and East Asia, is often cited as an 
example of this consideration. See R Emmers ‘Maritime Disputes in the South China Sea: Strategic and Diplomatic 
Status Quo’ Institute for Defence and Strategic Studies (IISS) Working Paper No. 87  (2005) at 7-9.  It is also the case 
that disputes over islands frequently give rise to overlapping maritime claims and this jurisdiction uncertainty may 
have implications for maritime security, undermining maritime security enforcement efforts. This is a potentially 
problematic issue given global dependence on sea-borne trade: over 80 per cent of world trade by volume being 
transported by sea. See, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Review of Maritime 
Transport 2008, (Geneva: UNCTAD, 2008): xii i  and 5. 
42 S. Arico and C. Salpin op cit note 39 at 17. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid at 18. 
45 See Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Office of Legal Affairs, United Nations, Table of Claims to 
Maritime Jurisdiction (2008) available at 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/table_summary_of_cl aims.pdf, accessed on 
28 November 2016. 




jurisdictional claims up to 200 nm is equivalent to the total land territory on the Earth’s surface.48 
Furthermore, it has been estimated that continental shelf claims extending beyond 200 nm may 
possibly cover an additional 5 percent of the world’s oceans.49 Consequently, the area of the 
world’s oceans left for the common heritage of mankind and the high seas is already relatively 
small. Any further reduction of these areas, resulting from excessive claims surrounding insular 
features, could be construed as a travesty of justice. This makes the need to clarify the ambiguities 
surrounding Article 121 even more poignant.  
2.3 Mixed State Practice Surrounding Insular Formations 
The need to obtain clarity regarding the interpretation of Article 121 is far from a theoretical issue. 
This issue is borne out in real life and is evidenced best by mixed State practice surrounding the 
regime of islands. It is no surprise that States tend to claim the greatest maritime jurisdictional 
zones available within the confines of international law. Accordingly, States in possession of 
insular features have generally advanced expansive maritime jurisdictional claims, even from tiny, 
remote and uninhabited insular features.50  
The most extreme case of this practice is, possibly, Japan’s continuous claims relating to the 
islets that constitute Okinotorishima.51 Okinotorishima is a group of features, also known as 
Douglas Reef, forming a reef platform which is surrounded by a cluster of minute rocks, which 
marginally protrude above the high-tide level.52 Although the actual reef platform is rather 
substantial in size, only two small rocks, just a few meters in area, remain above water at high 
tide. These two features have been described as no “larger than king-size beds” at high tide.53 
Nevertheless, Japan has controversially asserted that these features are islands and thus, 
capable of generating a 200 nm exclusive economic zone. Furthermore, Japan made submissions 
                                                                 
48 Symonds, P.A. Senior Adviser – Law of the Sea at Geoscience Australia (personal communication, July 2008). 
49 P.J. Cook and C.M. Carleton, Continental Shelf Limits, (2000) at 3. 
50 C.H. Schofield &  D.K. Wang, “Regime of Islands under UNCLOS: Implications for the South China Sea”, Maritime 
Energy Resources in Asia: Legal Regimes and Cooperation , NBR Special Report #37 (2012) at 68. 
51 See Y.H. Song, “Okinotorishima: A ‘Rock’ or an ‘Island’? Recent Maritime Boundary Controversy between Japan 
and Taiwan/China,” in Maritime Boundary Disputes, Settlement Processes, and the Law of the Sea, ed. S.Y. Hong 
and Jon. M. Van Dyke (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 2009), 145-176. 
52 J.R.V  Prescott and C.H. Schofield, The Maritime Political Boundaries of the World (2005) at 84-85. Yann-huei 
Song states that at “highest tide the two above-tide features are only 16 and 6 centimetres above the surface of 
the water, respectively. 
53 See Jon Van Dyke, “Speck in the Ocean Meets Law of the Sea,” letter to the editor, New York Times, January 21, 
1988; A.L. Silverstein, “Okinotorishima: Artificial Preservation of a Speck of Sovereignty,” Brooklyn Journal of 
International Law 16 no. 2 (1990): 409. 
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to UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf including additional continental shelf 
areas from these features.54 However, it must be noted that China objected to these claims with 
the wording that “State Parties shall also have the obligation to ensure respect for the extent of 
the International Seabed Area…which is the common heritage of mankind, and not to affect the 
overall interests of the international community as a whole.”55  
One need look no further than the unfolding events in the South China Sea for further examples 
of this expansionist trend. The status of numerous insular features under international law and 
thus, their capacity to generate maritime zones is a critical source of dispute in the South China 
Sea.56 Due to the region’s complex geographical, geological, geopolitical and legal features, it is 
considered a key potential “flashpoint” in East Asia and is viewed as an indicator for Southeast 
Asian Security.57 The Philippines initiated arbitral proceedings against China under Article 279 of 
the LOSC and has urged the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague to clarify the status of 
various insular formations claimed by China.58 
However, there are also instances of State practice, albeit more rare, which stand in contrast to 
this expansionist approach. In rare instances, certain States have chosen to adopt a more 
restrained approach to the generation of maritime jurisdictional claims from their insular features. 
Perhaps, the most notable example in this regard is the United Kingdom’s reclassification of 
Rockall, a tiny remote insular feature in ocean northwest of the British Isles. The United Kingdom 
initially used Rockall as a valid basepoint for a 200 nm maritime jurisdictional claim, but 
subsequently conducted a “roll-back” of these extensive claims in the face of mounting 
international objections. As a result, the United Kingdom relinquished around 60 000 nm² of its 
previously claimed fishery zone.59 
Mixed State practice concerning the regime of islands emphasises the need to rid Article 121 of 
its prevailing ambiguities. Obtaining a certain and clear interpretation of Article 121 is the first 
                                                                 
54 Japan’s Submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, available at 
http:/www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/jpn08/jpn_execsummary.pdf, accessed on 30 November 
2016.  
55 See China’s reaction to Japan’s submission at 
http:/www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/jpn08/chn_6feb09_e.pdf, accessed on 30 November 
2016. 
56 C.H. Schofield & D.K. Wang (2012) op cit note  at 61. 
57 Ibid. 
58 The implications of this arbitration on the interpretation of Article 121 of the LOSC will  be explored thoroughly in 
chapter 5 of this dissertation. 
59 C.H. Schofield & D.K. Wang (2012) op cit note 50 at 69. 
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logical step in attempting to unify State practice relating to the maritime jurisdictional claims based 
on insular features. This understanding elevates the research question of this dissertation out of 
the realm of theory and plants it firmly in our global reality, illustrating that ascertaining a clear 
interpretation of Article 121 has very real implications. The following chapter will dissect Article 























Dissecting Article 121 in Theory 
Article 121 of the LOSC reads as follows: 
“Regime of Islands 
 
1. An island is a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at 
high tide. 
2. Except as provided for in paragraph 3, the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the 
exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf of an island are determined in 
accordance with the provisions of this Convention applicable to other land territory.  
3. Rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall have no 
exclusive economic zone or continental shelf.”60 
 
Articles 121(1) and 121(2) are largely unproblematic. However, Article 121(3) has been the source 
of great controversy due to its ambiguous textual composition. Article 121(3) is made up of various 
textual elements which are capable of a variety of contrasting interpretations. Issues such as what 
is meant by “human habitation”, “economic life” and “of their own” riddle the provision, making it 
an interpretational nightmare. These are but a few of the ambiguous elements contained within 
the provision.61 The ambiguity contained in Article 121(3) seriously hampers any attempt to 
distinguishing between rocks and islands in the context of Article 121, the importance of which 
has been canvassed in detail in the previous chapter. Given the practical importance of the 
distinction between rocks and islands, it is surprising that Article 121 was drafted in an intentionally 
ambiguous manner. The drafting history of Article 121 will be explored below in order to illustrate 
why intentional ambiguity was elected over certainty.  
3.1  The Drafting History of Article 121: The Birth of Ambiguity 
As will be illustrated below, the drafting history of Article 121 of the LOSC does very little in 
shedding light on the intention of the drafters. If anything, an examination of the travaux 
préparatoires only exhibits the diversity of views provoked by the issue of islands.62 Nonetheless, 
                                                                 
60 Article 121 of the LOSC. 
61 The exact nature of Article 121(3)’s textual ambiguity is fleshed out later in this chapter.  
62 See, United Nations, United Nations Conferences on the Law of the Sea, Official Records, Third Conference, 
(Buffalo, New York: Will iam s. Hein & Co., 1980, reprinted 2000). See also S.N. Nandan and S. Rosenne United 
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the main themes evident during the negotiations surrounding the regime of islands at UNCLOS 
III are outlined below. 
3.1.1 Size 
The geographical size of an insular feature in relation to its capacity to generate maritime claims 
was a prominent theme in the negotiations regarding the regime of islands. Arguments regarding 
the size of insular features were even evident during the drafting process of Article 10 of the 1958 
Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone (CTSCZ).63 Although it was popularly 
asserted that the definition of an island should be coupled with a size limit in order to impede the 
ability of small, “pin-prick[s] of rocks”, to generate disproportionately large maritime claims64, 
ultimately, a size criterion was not incorporated into the 1958 CTSCZ.  
The size of an island as a basis for distinguishing between their maritime entitlements was raised 
again during the early sessions of UNCLOS III. Notably, Malta proposed that there should be a 
distinction between “islands” and “islets” based on the size of the feature. Malta asserted that 
islands should be more than one square kilometre in areas, whereas islets should be less than 
one square kilometre in area.65 Similarly, Ireland also proposed a size criterion in order for an 
insular feature to qualify as an island it must possess at least 10 percent of the population and 
land area of the State to which it belongs.66 A host of 14 African States67 also suggested that the 
ability of islands to generate maritime space should hinge on “equitable principles” which take into 
account “all relevant factors and circumstances”. The size of the island was forwarded as one of 
these “relevant factors and circumstances”.68 Furthermore, Romania also made proposals aimed 
at denying small insular features within their maritime zones from obtaining “true” island status.69 
                                                                 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982: A Commentary, Volume III (Dordrecht: Kluwer Law International, 
1995) at 321-339. 
63  H.W. Jayewardene, The Regime of Islands in International Law (1990) at 4-5. 
64 D.H.N. Johnson, D.H.N., “Artificial Islands”, International Law Quarterly Vol 4, 2 (1951) at 4. 
65 UN Doc.A/AC.138/SC.II/L.28, Article 1. See S.N. Nandan and  S. Rosenne (1995) op cit note 62 at 328. 
66 UN Doc.A/CONF.62/C.2/L.43 (1974). 
67 The 14 States included Algeria, Cameroon, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Mauritius, Senega l, 
Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Tunisia and Tanzania. 
68 UN Doc.A/AC.138/SC.II/L.40. S.N. Nandan and  S. Rosenne (1995) op cit note 62 at 329-330. 
69 S.N. Nandan and  S. Rosenne (1995) op cit note 62 at 330; UN Doc.A/AC.138/SC.II/L.53. Romania’s proposals 
concerned both size and habitability. Romania wanted to create a new category of insular features – “islets and 
small islands”, which should be “uninhabited and without economic l ife, which are situated on the continental 
shelf of the coast, do not possess any of the shelf or other marine space of the same nature.” 
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Differing national interests were obviously at play during these negotiations on size, as contrary 
views were also prevalent. Most notably, Greece, possessing many small insular features, 
responded to Malta’s proposal by asserting that “the regime of islands could not be legally based 
on criteria of size, population, geographical location or geological configuration without 
jeopardising the principles of sovereign equality and the integrity of territorial sovereignty.”70 In 
addition, Greece produced draft articles that emphasised that islands constitute an important 
contingent of the territory of the State which owns them and that the maritime zones claimable 
from the continental areas of the State should also apply to islands, regardless of their size.71 
Similarly, China proposed that all islands belonging to a State should enjoy the same breadths 
and limits of the territorial sea that the State enjoys.72 
There were also several nations present at UNCLOS III who counteracted the impetus towards 
connecting the definition of an island with size and habitability in order to maintain the status quo. 
These nations argued that there should be no distinctions of any kind as long as an island was 
above the high-water mark as it would be impossible to practically apply a list of criteria for islets 
or small islands in every geographical circumstance without resulting in inequitable outcomes in 
certain cases.73 
In a similar vein, small island States, with limited land resources, argued that all of their islands 
should generate an EEZ, regardless of characteristics such as size.74Four Pacific island States 
made a proposal to ensure that all islands should generate maritime entitlements “in accordance 
with provisions of the Convention applicable to other land territory.”75 
3.1.2 Diverse National Interests 
Upon examination of the travaux préparatoires it becomes apparent that the issue of islands 
provoked diverse views amongst the States present at the negotiations.76 It is clear that the 
                                                                 
70 UN Doc.A/AC.138/SC.II/L.29. See S.N. Nandan and  S. Rosenne (1995) op cit note 62 at 329. 
71 Ibid. 
72 C.R. Symmons, The Maritime Zones of Islands in International Law, (1979) at 40. 
73 Ibid. The United Kingdom delegate asserted that “…there was an immense diversity of island situations, ranging 
from large and populous islands of even larger continental States to small islands with self-sufficient populations, 
and that, inter alia, the attempt by some delegations to categorise islands in terms of size would not result in any 
generally applicable rules which would be equitable in all  cases; and there was grave danger of discounting many 
islands of both absolute and relative importance.” 
74 Schofield (2009) op cit note 4 at 87. 
75 UN Doc.A/CONF.62/C.2/L.30. See Nandan and Rosenne op cit note 62 at 331. 
76 See United Nations, ‘United Nations Conferences on the Law of the Sea, Official Records, Third Conference’ 
(1980, reprinted 2000). S.N. Nandan and  S. Rosenne (1995) op cit note 62 at 321-339. 
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drafters of the Article were faced with the challenge of bridging the rift between certain States 
which were keen to reduce the impact of small insular features on claims to maritime jurisdiction 
and other States which had a vested interest in maximising the maritime jurisdictional claims 
afforded to insular features. 
A key feature of the debates surrounding insular features at UNCLOS III centered on the specific 
national interests of many of the key contributors. These interests were not only linked to the 
ability of small insular features to generate large maritime jurisdictional claims, but also on the 
capacity of these insular features to impact on the delimitation of maritime boundaries.77 Certain 
coastal States, such as Romania, Turkey and Denmark, wanted to reduce the impact of islands 
on maritime jurisdictional claims and maritime boundary delimitation as they stood to benefit from 
such a minimisation. However, other States who possessed insular features, were pushing to 
maximise the potential claims afforded to these features. 
The separate national interests of the major contributors were rather transparent. Romania was 
particularly concerned with the potential of Ukraine’s possession of Ostrov Zmeiny (Serpents’ or 
Snake Island), a small island, situated 19nm of its coast, to influence the delimitation of maritime 
boundaries in the Black Sea.78 In a similar vein, Turkey wanted to restrict the potential maritime 
claims of insular features, a majority of which fall under Greek sovereignty, in the Aegean Sea.79 
Similarly, Denmark’s interest where twofold- safeguarding its maritime claims stemming from the 
Faeroe Islands, while also minimising the United Kingdom’s potential claims in the northeast 
Atlantic Ocean from Rockall.80 On the other hand, Greece had a vested interest in protecting and 
maximising the ability of its many insular features to generate maritime space. Venezuela was 
also anxious to preserve the ability of small insular features to generate extended maritime 
jurisdictional claims, as this would be beneficial to its claims surrounding Aves Island (Bird Rock) 
in the eastern Caribbean Sea.81 
All of the vested interests of the major contributors had to be taken into account by the drafters of 
Article 121. The draft for the final text of Article 121 was proposed in 1975 at the third session of 
                                                                 
77 R. Beckman and C.H. Schofield, ‘Moving Beyond Disputes over Island Sovereignty: ICJ Decision Sets Stage for 
Maritime Boundary Delimitation in the Singapore Strait’, Ocean Development and International Law, Volume 40 
(2009) 1-35 at 9-10. 
78 J.R.V. Prescott and C.H. Schofield op cit not 52 at 335. 
79 Ibid at 68-70. 
80 Ibid at 70-72. 
81 Ibid at 72-75. 
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UNCLOS III.82 However, it was decided that during the course of the informal and formal 
consultations, the scope of the draft article should be narrowed to exclude insular features held 
by colonial powers83 and the effect of insular features on the delimitation of maritime boundaries. 
A large group of nations, spearheaded by Ireland, were particularly concerned with the latter issue 
as it impacted on their geographical situations and national interests.84 As a result the role of 
islands in maritime boundary delimitation was excluded from the regime of islands and was rather 
set aside for States to determine politically as they set their maritime boundaries.85 
The draft text that emerged in 1975 consisted of 3 paragraphs. Paragraph one echoed verbatim 
the text of Article 10 of the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone: 
“1. An island is a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above high 
tide.” 
The second paragraph was a simple restatement of the principle that islands should generate 
maritime zones in the same way as other land territory: 
“2. Except as provided for in paragraph 3, the territorial sea, the contiguous zone and the 
continental shelf of an island are determined in accordance with the provisions of this 
Convention applicable to other land territory.” 
The third, and problematic, paragraph seemed to be an adaption of Romania’s proposals 
regarding small islands and islets86: 
“3. Rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall have no 
exclusive economic zone or continental shelf.” 
Although various amendments were proposed, the 1975 draft text remained unaltered throughout 
later negotiating documents. Various amendments were proposed, even to the extent of deleting 
                                                                 
82 Article 132 of the Informal Single Negotiating Text of 1975 proposed by Reynaldo Galindo Pohl, of El Salvador, 
Chairman of the Second Committee of UNCLOS III at the time. 
83 See J.R.V. Prescott and C.H. Schofield op cit note 52 at 335; The issue of “islands under colonial dependence or 
foreign domination or control” was raised by Trinidad and Tobago, and reflected concerns on the part of many 
newly independent developing States over the remaining colonial territories of former colonial powers, including 
far flung and often small island possessions. 
84 Ibid at 332. Ireland’s observation that: “it is generally agreed that offshore islands should not be used as the base 
point for measuring an equidistance boundary l ine in all circumstances ”, was supported by most nations. 
85 Schofield (2009) op cit note 4 at 89. 
86 J.R.V. Prescott and C.H. Schofield (2005) op cit note 52 at 336-338. 
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the third paragraph of the Article in its entirety.87 Many delegations present at the negotiations 
pointed out that the third paragraph was ambiguous ad would breed problems.88 However, all of 
the proposed amendments to the draft Article 121 were ultimately rejected. Consequently the 
status quo prevailed, resulting in the ambiguous 1958 definition being left intact and incorporated 
into Article 121 of the LOSC. 
The above exhibits that the text of Article 121, especially paragraph three, was formulated in an 
intentionally ambiguous fashion.89 There is little doubt that Article 121 is constructed from lowest 
common-denominator language in order to encourage States, often with divergent views on the 
issue, to assent.90 The text of Article 121 was designed to be interpreted in a variety of ways, 
making any attempt at arriving at a clear interpretation of Article 121 a herculean task. Whilst 
Articles 121(1) and 121(2) are relatively straight forward, Article 121(3) is largely ambiguous. 
Article 121(3) comprises of a host of textual elements that can all be interpreted in different ways, 
making interpreting the Article a complex task. Thus, correctly distinguishing between islands and 
rocks in the context of Article 121 will be impossible until the various textual elements of Article 
121(3), discussed below, have been clarified. 
3.2 Dissecting the Textual Elements of Article 121(3) 
Article 121(3) of the LOSC incorporates various textual elements that need to be considered. 
These elements include the terms “rocks”, “cannot”, “sustain”, “human habitation”, “or”, and 
“economic life of their own”. These elements can be interpreted in a variety of ways, making Article 
121(3) the source of much ambiguity. Each aforementioned element will be discussed below. 
Whether or not a concrete interpretation of these elements has been reached through State 
practice, particularly that of national legislation on islands and insular status, and the 
jurisprudence of international (and national, where appropriate) courts and tribunals will be 
analysed in the following chapter. 
First, the use of the word “rocks” in Article 121(3) of the LOSC is contentious as it raises the 
question of whether the drafters of the LOSC intended any form of geomorphological or geological 
                                                                 
87 The United Kingdom suggested a complete removal of the third paragraph during the eleventh session of 
UNCLOS III, but this proposal was strongly opposed by Turkey among others. J.R.V. Prescott and C.H. Schofield 
(2005) op cit note 52 at 70. 
88 Ibid at 330-336; R. Beckman and C.H. Schofield (2009) op cit note 77 at 10. 




criteria. Put simply, is Article 121(3) only supposed to apply to insular features that are made up 
of solid rock or that are alternatively rock-like in nature?91 
Second, the word “cannot” in Article 121(3) can be construed as ambiguous as it is uncertain 
whether the word indicates a concept of capacity.92 In other words, in order for an insular feature 
to be classified as a rock should the enquiry be concerned with whether the feature actually 
sustains human habitation and economic life at the present time, or should the enquiry rather 
hinge upon an objective assessment of the feature’s ability to sustain human habitation and 
economic life.93 Does the fact that an insular feature is currently uninhabited and does not 
currently sustain economic life prove that the feature is incapable of ever sustaining a population 
or economic life?94 
Third, the word “sustain” can be interpreted in a variety of ways. Does the word “sustain” indicate 
a time or qualitative element, or both?95 Exactly what is meant by the word will have a significant 
impact on how terms like “human population” and “economic life” are in turn interpreted. 
Fourth, the term “human habitation” can be interpreted in a various ways. The ordinary meaning 
of “human habitation” needs to be discerned in order to bring clarity to Article 121(3). Furthermore, 
does the term “habitation” imply a qualitative element?96 It is uncertain whether the mere survival 
of a group of people on an insular feature would be sufficient to satisfy the threshold of human 
habitation or whether the feature must also provide conditions which are sufficiently conducive for 
human life so that people can actually inhabit, as opposed to merely survive, on the feature.97 
Additionally, forms of human habitation and livelihood may differ greatly. Should a particular 
culture or mode of habitation be assumed for the purposes of Article 121(3)?98 If not, then surely 
there should be certain factors that are constant wherever human habitation occurs.99 If this is the 
case then the exact nature of these factors also has to be discerned. 
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Another source of confusion in this regard is whether the term “human habitation” implies a 
minimum number of people.100 As Article 121(3) does not specify any specific number of people, 
would the existence of a single person on an insular feature fall within the ordinary understanding 
of human habitation?101 
Fifth, Article 121(3) of the LOSC states that “rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or 
economic life of their own shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf”. Thus, the 
question that arises is whether the criteria of capacity to sustain “human habitation” and 
“economic life of its own” are both required for an insular feature to generate an EEZ and 
continental shelf, or if either one of these criteria in isolation will be sufficient.102 
Finally, the next element of the text of Article 121(3) that requires consideration is the term 
“economic life of their own”. This phrase is particularly contentious as it includes two elements 
that will need to be interpreted in order to clarify Article 121(3). First, what is meant by economic 
life needs to be unpacked and then, second, what is intended by the term “of their own” will also 
need to be interpreted.  
What is meant by “economic” and “life” can create ambiguity in the Article. Furthermore, as 
“economic life” needs to be read in conjunction with the time component of “sustain”, would a 
once off transaction be sufficient or would the economic activity need to be ongoing?103 As the 
drafters of the Article chose not to import any reference to the value of the economic activity, 
would the need for the economic activity to be sustained over a period of time imply that the 
economic activity must be viable?104 
A further question that needs to be answered is whether economic activity centered on the 
exploitation of the resources in the territorial sea, the EEZ and the continental shelf is a sufficient 
to endow and insular feature with economic life.105 
Additionally, the term “of their own” raises further questions that need to be clarified. Must the 
insular feature be able to support an independent economic life without relying largely on the 
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infusion of outside resources or serving only as an object for extractive activities, which do not 
incorporate the local population?106  
An exploration of the textual elements of Article 121(3) illustrates and explains the complexity of 
the provision. A bare reading of the text of Article 121(3) points towards the inescapable 
conclusion that a textual interpretation alone will never yield exact answers on how to distinguish 
between rocks and islands in the context of Article 121. However, in order to avoid conflict 
between States and create much needed legal certainty, a definitive interpretation of Article 
121(3) is crucial. State practice regarding the issue is simply too veined to aid in creating a clear 
interpretation of Article 121(3).107 Perhaps, mixed State practice relating to the distinction between 
rocks and islands is an unavoidable symptom of the ambiguous nature of Article 121(3). The only 
remaining meaningful avenue for clarifying Article 121 is through international jurisprudence on 
the issue. The following chapter is dedicated to an exploration of international jurisprudence 
insofar as it relates to the distinction between rocks and islands and seeks to determine if 
international jurisprudence has arrived at a clear interpretation of Article 121 with particular 
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Past Sources of Clarification – A Dead End? 
4.1 Sources of Clarification 
As seen in the previous chapter, it is impossible to interpret Article 121 through the lens of current 
existing materials on the subject. It is only through the practice of States in the way they interpret 
Article 121 and the rulings of international courts and tribunals that some form of clarity may 
emerge regarding Article 121. However, up until this point State practice and international 
jurisprudence has proved largely unhelpful as both international courts and States have 
unfortunately opted to side-step the issue. 
However, there have been various developments in international jurisprudence in recent years 
which offer prospects for clarifying Article 121. In the realm of international jurisprudence, For the 
purposes of answering the primary research question of this dissertation, five cases which have 
direct implications on the interpretation of Article 121 of the LOSC will be examined in further 
detail. These cases are the Anglo-French Arbitration,108 the Jan Mayen Case,109 the Volga 
Case,110 the Pedra Branca Case,111 and the more recently concluded Black Sea Case.112  
These cases will be presented in chronological order as this is a logical method of analysis when 
considering whether, over time, the international community is moving towards certainty regarding 
Article 121, with particular reference to the distinction between rocks and islands. It will be 
evidenced below that international courts and tribunals have been reluctant to interpret Article 
121, but an attempt will be made to investigate whether the aforementioned cases present 
prospects for clarifying one or more of the textual elements of Article 121(3), as referred to in the 
previous chapter. 
 
                                                                 
108 Arbitration between the United Kingdom and France on the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf, Decision of 30 
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4.1.1 The Anglo-French Arbitration 
The Anglo-French Arbitration concerned the delimitation of the continental shelf boundary 
between France and the United Kingdom in the English Channel. A Court of Arbitration was 
established by France and the United Kingdom for this purpose. During the arbitration the Court 
had the opportunity to address the question of the insular status of Eddystone Rock, a key 
basepoint in the English Channel. 
The United Kingdom asserted that Eddystone Rock constituted an island and was thus a valid 
basepoint that could be used for the creation of a median line between the British and French 
coasts. To bolster this claim, the United Kingdom referred to vertical datum on British Admiralty 
nautical charting to evidence that Eddystone Rock was above high tide. In particular, during the 
oral arguments, counsel for the United Kingdom stated that “Eddystone Rocks do constitute an 
island” as they “only cover entirely at high water equinoctial springs” and protrude from the water 
at mean high water spring tides which reflect the United Kingdom’s choice of vertical datum.113 In 
opposition, France asserted that Eddystone Rocks was a mere low-tide elevation as the formation 
was not uncovered throughout the duration of the year.114 
In regard to their election of vertical datum, the United Kingdom asserted that both customary law 
and Article 10 of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone held that “the relevant 
high-water line is the line of mean high-water spring tides.” The United Kingdom claimed that this 
was in fact the high-water line depicted on all British Admiralty Charts and that many other States 
supported this view. Additionally, The United Kingdom recognised that it was possible to have 
different interpretations of the high-water line, but still asserted that that the mean high-water 
spring tides is the only precise interpretation and that House Rock protruded two feet above this 
level and 0.2 feet above the highest astronomical tide.115 In rebuttal, the French government 
responded that “the British concept of high-water is very questionable” and that a vast number of 
States interpret high-water to mean “the limit of the highest tides.”116 France claimed that even 
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based on the United Kingdom’s own data, that Eddystone Rocks were “only very slightly above 
highest full-tides and may be covered by them.”117 Furthermore, France drew the court’s attention 
to the fact that the United Kingdom had not included Eddystone Rocks into its straight baseline 
system, undermining its assertions that the formations were indeed islands.118 
Unfortunately, the court side-stepped any analysis of an interpretation of Article 121. The court 
established that France had acquiesced with regard to the United Kingdom’s use of Eddystone 
Rocks use as a basepoint for the delimitation of the United Kingdom’s fishery zone and in regard 
to its use as a basepoint for the creation of median lines in the Channel.119 Ultimately, the court 
concluded that Eddystone Rock should be treated as a valid basepoint for the delimitation of the 
continental shelf boundary in the English Channel. However, the court did not take a position 
pertaining to the parties’ different views on the precise legal status of Eddystone Rock.120 This 
presents an example of the reluctance of international courts and tribunals to tackle the issue of 
interpreting Article 121 of the LOSC. This trend has been echoed in all of the subsequent cases 
discussed in this chapter. At best, only certain hints on the interpretation of Article 121 of the 
LOSC can be gleamed from the cases that follow. 
4.1.2 The Jan Mayen Case 
The Jan Mayen Case, between Norway and Denmark, involved the delimitation of the maritime 
boundary of Jan Mayen Island, owned by Norway, and Greenland. The ICJ was called upon by 
the concerned States to draw a definitive line of delimitation for their respective continental shelf 
and fishing zone areas.121 Unfortunately, Denmark did not claim that Jan Mayen was an Article 
121(3) rock, precluding it from generating continental shelf rights. Thus, the court did not have to 
address the issue of island classification and the distinction between islands, which are capable 
of generating extended maritime zones, and rocks which are incapable of generating such claims. 
Consequently, as in the Anglo-French Arbitration, very little information relating to the 
interpretation of Article 121 can be gleamed from this case.  
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However, the case is relevant to the present discussion as Jan Mayen was generally considered 
to be an island, which was capable of generating extended maritime claims, based purely on its 
size.122 Perhaps, this reasoning was based on the fact that Jan Mayen is 54.8 km long, which is 
far larger than the formations under consideration for inclusion in Article 121(3) at UCLOS III. 123 
This may, arguably, suggest that any insular formations equal or greater in size to Jan Mayen will 
automatically be considered islands and not mere rocks. The argument that size alone should 
determine the status of an insular formation carries very little weight in light of the drafting history 
of Article 121 and its lack of popularity in subsequent jurisprudence. 
The issue of the size of insular formations as it relates to distinguishing between rocks and islands 
is an issue that was debated thoroughly during the negotiations at UNCLOS III. Ultimately, no 
size criterion was included in the final text of Article 121. This could suggest that size alone should 
not be a determinative factor when distinguishing between rocks and islands. However, the issue 
of the size of an insular formation as it relates to the capacity of the formation to sustain human 
habitation and an economic life of its own has been raised in subsequent cases. Most notably, 
the issue was raised in the Black Sea Case, but the Court chose not to explore the issue. The 
issue was later explored in the South China Sea Arbitration where it was found that size can be 
determinative in distinguishing between rocks and islands, only insofar as the size of the insular 
formation relates to its capacity to sustain human habitation and an economic life of its own. These 
two elements – human habitation and economic life – are fundamental in distinguishing between 
rocks and islands and the size of an insular formation should only be considered when it has a 
direct correlation to the capacity of the insular formation to sustain these two elements. 
4.1.3 The Volga Case 
The Volga Case was brought before ITLOS and concerned the prompt release of a Russian 
fishing vessel that was apprehended for alleged illegal fishing in the waters surrounding 
Australia’s Heard and McDonald Islands. The Volga Case is relevant to the present discussion, 
as Judge Budislav Vukas pronounced specifically on the issue of islands and Article 121 of the 
LOSC. In his separate declaration, Judge Vukas clearly recorded his opposition to the extensive 
EEZ claims that Australia had made around McDonald and Heard Islands. He reasoned that 
Australia should not have made such extensive claims around the formations as: 
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“The reason for giving exclusive rights to the coastal states was to protect the economic interests 
of the coastal communities that depended on the resources of the sea, and thus to promote their 
economic development and enable them to feed themselves. This rationale does not apply to 
uninhabited islands, because they do not have coastal fishing communities that need such 
assistance.124” 
Judge Vukas acknowledged that declaring and EEZ around insular formations may be useful for 
preserving the marine environment, however, he disagreed that Australia needed exclusive rights 
to meet this objective. He reasoned that there are alternative methods to preserve and protect 
the fragile resources around the formations, such as by way of the Convention on the 
Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR).125 Judge Vukas had previously 
taken a similar stance in regard to France’s extensive EEZ claims  around the Kerguelen Island, 
which adjoins Australia’s claims around Heard and McDonald Islands.126 
Both Heard and McDonald Islands are undoubtedly inhospitable and remote in character. Heard 
Island is situated in the sub-Antarctic waters 2200 nm southwest of Perth, while McDonald Island 
is located 23 nm further west.127 Although these formations lack permanent inhabitants, they are 
rather large in size. McDonald Island and its associated islets encompass around 2.5 km² in area, 
while Heard Island canvasses a far greater area of 368 km². Australia claimed its 200 nm fishing 
zone around Heard and McDonald Islands in 1979 and had encountered no known formal protests 
from other States. Even the Russian Federation did not challenge Australia’s claims around Heard 
and McDonald Islands. Additionally, the majority views of the ITLOS may be interpreted as 
validating Australia’s claim to an EEZ around the formations.  
Judge Vukas’ objections were raised through a separate declaration. However, it is likely that the 
majority were of the view that Australia’s claims around the Heard and McDonald Islands were 
not of direct relevance to the prompt release of the fishing vessel which the ITLOS had to consider 
without delay. This reasoning is strengthened in light of Russia’s non-challenge to Australia’s EEZ 
claims around the formations.128 Thus, it remains somewhat unclear as to the extent that Judge 
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Vukas’ objection clarifies Article 121 of the LOSC. However, the objection of Judge Vukas seems 
to signify that the distinction between an Article 121(1) island and an Article 121(3) rock hinges 
primarily on whether the island is inhabited or capable of habitation. Unfortunately, Judge Vukas 
stopped short of exploring what is actually meant by the element of human habitation mentioned 
in Article 121(3) of the LOSC. Arguably, all that can discerned from Judge Vukas’ objection is that 
when the status of an insular feature is in question, the most important factor to be considered is 
whether the insular feature sustains human habitation or is capable of doing so. This could imply 
that the other elements of Article 121(3), such as economic life and size should be attributed a 
diminished importance in determining the status of insular features.  
Although this may shed light on the weight to be attributed to the elements of Article 121(3) when 
distinguishing between rocks and islands, what is meant by human habitation was left 
unaddressed. Furthermore, because Judge Vukas’ reasoning centres solely on the element of 
human habitation and the issue of distinguishing between rocks and islands was overlooked by 
the other Judges, the Volga Case does little to clarify the ambiguous elements of Article 121(3). 
4.1.4 The Pedra Branca Case 
The Pedra Branca Case concerned the sovereignty over three tiny insular formations (Pedra 
Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks and South Ledge) situated where the Singapore Strait 
opens into the South China Sea. The ICJ ruled that Singapore enjoyed sovereignty over Pedra 
Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh (Pedra Branca)129, while Malaysia enjoys sovereignty over Middle 
Rocks. The court did not specifically determine who enjoys sovereignty over South Ledge.130 
Pedra Branca is the largest of the three disputed features. It is a small island made of granite, 
covering an area of roughly 8560 m² at low tide. A British Admiralty Pilot described Pedra Branca 
as “a rock, 7m high, on the southeast side of the Middle Channel” adorned by Horsburgh Light 
which was constructed on the island in 1850.131 Additionally, navigational facilities and a helicopter 
pad were built on the island.132 Middle Rocks is located 0.6 nm to the south of Pedra Branca and 
comprises of two clusters of rocks which are about 250 m apart and are permanently, ever so 
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slightly, above water at high tide.133 South Ledge is a low-tide elevation, located 2.2 nm southwest 
of Pedra Branca.134 
Unfortunately, the question before the ICJ in the Pedra Branca Case was one of territorial 
sovereignty. The legal status of the three disputed features was not at issue. Notably, however, 
in the judgement the ICJ referred to Pedra Branca as “a tiny uninhabited and uninhabitable 
island.”135 The ICJ’s characterisation of Pedra Branca as “tiny” certainly is not controversial. 
However, the ICJ’s declaration that Pedra Branca is “uninhabited and uninhabitable” is interesting. 
As mentioned earlier, Pedra Branca has been the site of an important lighthouse for many years 
and boasts a number of other facilities. It has also been under continuous British and, more 
recently, Singaporean occupation since the 19th century.  
The ICJ’s use of the term “uninhabited” to describe Pedra Branca thus, implies that the 
government personnel stationed on the formation, even for an extended period of time, do not 
qualify as a population. This suggests that occupying a small formation with what amounts to a 
garrison does fail to render the formation capable of human habitation in terms of Article 121(3) 
of the LOSC. The ICJ’s declaration on human habitation in the context of Article 121(3) of the 
LOSC could have implications for various small islands scattered across the globe whose only 
population comprises of research scientists and government personnel. Examples of such islands 
include many of the formations in the Spratly group as well as Japan’s Okinotorishima.  
Although the Pedra Branca Case did more than the Volga Case to unpack the meaning of the 
element of human habitation, it cannot be said that the Pedra Branca Case truly illuminates what 
the drafters of the LOSC intended when they inserted the element of human habitation into Article 
121(3). The Pedra Branca Case sheds some light on what is not meant by the element of human 
habitation, but falls short of clarifying what is meant by the element of human habitation. The 
Pedra Branca Case certainly does more than the Volga Case to engage with the element of 
human habitation, but fails to bring much needed clarity to the element of human habitation as all 
that can be discerned from the judgement is that government personnel stationed on a formation, 
even for an extended period of time, do not qualify as a population for the purposes of human 
habitation. It is evident that the element of human population is attributed great significance in 
determining the status of insular features and therefore a more wholesome exploration of the 
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element of human habitation would have been desirable in order to bring clarity to Article 121(3) 
of the LOSC. 
4.1.5 The Black Sea Case: A Missed Opportunity? 
In the Black Sea Case the insular status of Ostrov Zmeinyy (Serpents ’ Island) was disputed 
between Romania and Ukraine. The Serpents’ Island belongs to Ukraine and is located around 
19 nm from the terminus of the land boundary between Ukraine and Romania. Serpents’ Island 
is described as a sheer-sided formation that rises to a height of 39.6 m and has a surface area of 
1.135 km².136 Romania has long been concerned about the presence of Serpents ’ Island off its 
mainland coast and the possible effect of the formation on the delimitation of maritime boundaries. 
This was evidenced by the multiple interventions and draft articles issued by Romania during the 
course of the negotiations at UNCLOS III, which sought to minimise the capacity of small islands 
and islets to generate maritime claims and their effect on maritime boundary delimitation. It was 
no secret that Romania issued these interventions during the negotiations at UNCLOS III as it 
was concerned about minimising the potential impact of Serpents’ Island in regard to the 
delimitation of its maritime boundaries with the Soviet Union.137 
The Black Sea Case is of importance to the current discussion as both Romania and Ukraine 
explicitly addressed the issue of Article 121 of the LOSC and its application to the Serpents ’ Island 
in both their written pleadings and oral arguments.138 A central argument in Romania’s case was 
that Serpents’ Island was a mere rock and is therefore only entitled to generate a territorial sea 
and, additionally, should not form a valid basepoint for the construction of the equidistance line 
for the EEZ/continental shelf boundary. Romania made consistent attacks on the insular status of 
Serpents’ Island and particularly cast doubt on the ability of the formation to sustain human 
habitation or an economic life of its own. 
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Counsel for Romania emphasised in its oral arguments that Article 121(3) “rocks” are a sub-
category of islands.139 Thus, counsel for Romania asserted that all “rocks” meet the definition of 
islands as expressed in Article 121(1) as they are naturally formed areas of land, which are 
surrounded by water and above water at high tide.140 In this regard, Romania referred to Article 
121 as a “carefully crafted provision which distinguishes between two different categories of 
island.”141 
In relation to the interpretation of Article 121, Romania took note of the fact that Article 121 
included no size criterion in the definition of “rocks”, but asserted that there is a link between the 
size of an insular formation and its ability to sustain human habitation or an economic life of its 
own.142 Thus, the larger the insular formation, the more likely it is to be able to sustain human 
habitation and an economic life of its own. In contrast, the smaller an insular formation, the less 
likely it will be to sustain human habitation and an economic life of its own. Furthermore, Romania 
observed that applying any of the various proposals regarding the size-based criteria for 
distinguishing between rocks and islands that were raised during UNCLOS III would “plainly have 
left Serpents’ Island in the ‘paragraph 3’ category.”143Particular reference was made to Malta’s 
1km² criterion144 in comparison to the meagre area of the Serpents’ Islands (0.17 km²); and the 
Irish proposal that islands should at least possess 10 percent of the land area and the population 
of the State145, in comparison with the area of the Serpents’ Islands only amounting to “less than 
one three-millionth of 1 per cent” of Ukraine’s land territory.146 
In its written pleadings Ukraine asserted that “for the purposes of Article 121, the ability to sustain 
human habitation is to be understood as meaning that, as a matter of practice over a number of 
years, human habitation has been shown to be possible on the island, while the ability to sustain 
an economic life of its own is to be understood as meaning that, as a matter of practice over a 
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number of years, life on the island has proved economically sustainable.”147However, in its oral 
arguments, Romania objected to this statement as it felt that certain aspects were “tendentious 
and highly problematic”.148The Romanian Counsel asserted that evidencing the possibility of 
human habitation on a feature does not amount to proof that the feature can actually sustain 
human habitation.149  
Additionally, Ukraine asserted that human habitation is not equivalent to a permanent resident 
population and argued that notional occupation of tiny insular features by military personnel for 
the purpose of staking vast maritime jurisdictional claims is not what the drafters of the LOSC 
intended.150 Romania responded to this by stating that “Article 121 requires that the rock should 
be capable of sustaining human habitation or economic life of its own. It is not enough that the 
mainland State can keep people alive on the rock, and persuade, or order, people to stay on it for 
a period of time.”151In advancing these arguments, Romania noted that it would be ” idle to pretend 
that the Law of the Sea Convention defines precisely what is necessary in the way of human 
habitation, or that the travaux préparatoires give clear guidance on that question. They do not.” 152 
Romania then went on to emphasise that in order to qualify as an island within the meaning of 
Article 121, human habitation needs to be sustained over an extended period of time. Romania 
bolstered this argument by referring to the ICJ’s characterization of Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu 
Puteh as “a tiny uninhabited and uninhabitable island”.153  
In relation to the “economic life” criterion in Article 121(3), Ukraine argued that “economic life” is 
not the same as viability as an independent, self-contained and self-sufficient economy involving 
the development of natural resources, since these terms refer to lesser forms of economic 
activity.”154 Additionally, Ukraine felt that “in relation to small maritime features, these criteria can 
be satisfied by small-scale activities generating income and expenditure and the flow of goods 
and services (such as scientific research and tourism).”155 
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It is worth noting that Ukraine emphasized that considerable ambiguity plagues the meaning of 
the terms “human habitation” and “economic life of its own”.156 However, Romania asserted that 
even in the face of such ambiguity the Serpent’s Island is “bleak, inhospitable with no fresh water” 
and “no more capable of sustaining human life and habitation than a steel oil platform would 
be.”157 Romania also noted that the small-scale economic activities that Ukraine referred to were 
simply perfunctory and did not meet the threshold of meaningful economic life.158Furthermore, 
Romania asserted that the economic life of the Serpents ’ Island does not exist outside of 
Ukrainian government’s budget and that “if the Government stops pouring money into the rock, 
the people currently paid to be there will undoubtedly pour out.”159 
 
In an attempt to counter the arguments made by Romania, Ukraine emphasised the importance 
of the Serpent’s Islands as being a prominent feature in the Back Sea and that map makers 
consistently referred to the feature as an island.160 Furthermore, Ukraine asserted that based on 
the presented graphic evidence that Serpents’ Island was certainly not a rock within the meaning 
of Article 121(3).161 Noting the ambiguity in Article 121(3), Ukraine argued that the Article does 
not refer only to actual human habitation or economic life, but rather the capacity of the feature to 
sustain human habitation or economic life.162 
Additionally, Ukraine argued that the fact that an island relies on the mainland for the provision of 
resources should not disqualify it from having an economic life of its own. Ukraine stated that this 
was common practice and that a restrictive interpretation, like the one advanced by Romania, 
would disqualify a large number of small islands around the globe.163 
Finally, Ukraine pointed towards the failure of Romania’s proposal to secure special status for 
islets at the negotiations at UNCLOS III. Ukraine asserted that this proposal was undoubtedly 
made with the Serpents’ Islands in mind, however, this proposal was rejected. In raising this 
argument, Ukraine stated that “It is no secret that these proposals were aimed at Serpents’ 
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Island… Romania itself did not consider Serpents’ Island as a rock within the meaning of Article 
121 (3)”.164 
As seen above, both Ukraine and Romania advanced arguments that applied directly to the 
interpretation of Article 121 of the LOSC, inviting the Court to engage meaningfully with an 
interpretation of the provision. The issues laid before the Court by the parties canvassed more 
than just the element of human habitation. The parties raised issues relating to the various other 
unclear elements of Article 121(3), such as the element of economic life and that of the link 
between the size of an insular formation and its ability to sustain human habitation and an 
economic life of its own. The averments made by the parties encouraged the Court to explore the 
other elements of Article 121(3) and not just the element of human habitation, which was the only 
element dealt with, and in a limited sense, by the Courts in the Volga and Pedra Branca cases.  
 
However, the Court side-stepped the issue in its judgment. Ultimately, the Court ruled that the 
Serpents’ Island was not capable of serving as a basepoint for the construction of a provisional 
equidistance line. Accordingly, the Court found that the presence of Serpents’ Islands “does not 
call for an adjustment of the provisional equidistance line and, further, that “[i]n view of the above 
the Court does not need to consider whether Serpents’ Island falls under paragraphs 2 or 3 of 
Article 121 of UNCLOS nor their relevance to this case.”165 
 
Strictly speaking, if the Court had made a ruling on the interpretation of Article 121, it would only 
bind Romania and Ukraine as parties to the dispute. However, had the Court decided whether 
Serpents’ Island was an Article 121(3) rock, the Court’s reasoning would hold authoritative value 
and be afforded considerable weight by other courts and tribunals and States. Consequently, it is 
difficult to view the reluctance of the Court to meaningfully tackle this issue as anything more than 
a frustrating missed opportunity to aid in the clarification of Article 121 of the LOSC.  
4.2 A Dead End, Indeed – Conclusions to be Drawn from State Practice and 
International Jurisprudence 
As evidenced above, the past jurisprudence of international courts and tribunals has, 
unfortunately, done little to offer an authoritative interpretation of Article 121. Such an 
interpretation remains lacking as international courts and tribunals have proven adept at 
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effectively side-stepping the complex interpretational issues which riddle the regime of islands. 
Consequently, coastal States were still frequently confronted with challenging issues regarding 
islands. 
However, the recent South China Sea Arbitration has marked a significant shift in the trend of 
side-stepping the important interpretational issues that vex the regime of islands. The following 
chapter is dedicated to an analysis of the South China Sea Arbitration and how the Tribunal 




















Chapter 5  
The South China Sea Arbitration – A Step in the Right Direction 
5.1 Context and Background 
The South China Sea constitutes a semi-enclosed sea within the Western Pacific Ocean.166 The 
South China Sea spans an area of 3.5 million kilometers and includes hundreds of insular 
features, both below and above water.167 The South China Sea abuts several States – lying to 
the south of China and the islands of Taiwan and Hainan, to the east of Vietnam, to the west of 
the Philippines and to the north of Brunei, Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore.168 Recently the 
Philippines has objected to the expansive maritime jurisdictional claims made by China in the 
South China Sea. The Philippines approached the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague 
for a declaratory award on a host of issues related to China’s actions in the South China Sea. 
However, for the purposes of this dissertation, only the second matter raised, relating to whether 
the insular features claimed by China and the Philippines have been correctly characterized, and 
the maritime claims these features are capable of generating, will be analysed as it has a direct 
bearing on the interpretation of Article 121 of the LOSC. Ultimately, the Tribunal agreed with the 
Philippine’s assertion that all of the high tide features in the Spratly Island group were rocks and 
not islands, invalidating China’s expansive claims to marine jurisdiction in the region. 
The South China Sea Arbitration has marked a monumental shift in the trend of side-stepping the 
important interpretational issues that vex the regime of islands.  The Tribunal employed a three-
pronged approach in interpreting Article 121, relying on an analysis of the textual elements of the 
Article; a consideration of the context, object and purpose of the Article; and an exploration of the 
drafting history of Article 121(3). The manner in which the Tribunal addressed these three 
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5.2 The Textual Elements 
5.2.1 “Rocks” 
The Tribunal expressly addressed the question of whether the term “rocks” implies a 
geomorphological or geological criteria.169 In this regard, the Tribunal was of the view that no such 
restriction was intended by the drafters of Article 121(3).170 This was based on the dictionary 
definition of “rock” which states that rocks may “consist of aggregates of minerals . . . and 
occasionally also organic matter . . . . They vary in hardness, and include soft materials such as 
clays.”171 The Tribunal also referred to the decision in Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua 
v. Colombia) to bolster its conclusion, in which it was held that Quitasueño, a miniscule protrusion 
of Coral, held by Colombia was an Article 121(3) rock as “International law defines an island by 
reference to whether it is ‘naturally formed’ and whether it is above water at high tide, not by 
reference to its geological composition . . . The fact that the feature is composed of coral is 
irrelevant.” 172  
Furthermore, the Tribunal also recognised that the imposition of any such geological criteria on 
Article 121(3) would result in absurdity.173 This is because rocks are deemed a category of islands 
within Article 121. Article 121 defines an island as a “naturally formed area of land” and does not 
incorporate any geomorphological or geological qualification.174 If such a qualification was 
included in paragraph 3, any high-tide features composed of mud, sand, coral or gravel – 
regardless of their other characteristics – would always produce extended maritime claims.175 This 
would always be the case, irrespective of the feature’s ability to sustain human habitation and 
economic life of its own.176 As such features are more transient than features composed of 
geological rock, a geological criterion would mean that greater entitlements are afforded to 
features that are less stable and permanent.177 This, in the view of the Tribunal, could not have 
been the intent of the Article. 
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Accordingly, “rocks” within the context of Article 121(3) do not necessarily have to be composed 
of geological rock. The Tribunal noted further that the name of an insular feature will play no role 
in determining whether the feature qualifies as an Article 121(3) rock.178 Insular features may be 
entirely submerged and still have “Rock” or “Island” in their name.179 Equally, insular features with 
“Reef” or “Shoal” in their names may protrude above water at high tide.180 Ultimately, the name of 
an insular feature offers no guidance in a determination of whether it is capable of sustaining 
human habitation or an economic life of its own.181 
5.2.2 “Cannot” 
The Tribunal noted that the word “cannot” in Article 121(3) implies a concept of capacity.182 In 
other words, does the insular feature in its natural form possess the capacity to sustain human 
habitation or economic life? Ultimately, if it does not then it is a rock.183 In the view of the Tribunal, 
this enquiry does not centre on whether the insular feature actually does sustain human habitation 
or economic life, but rather whether the insular feature is, objectively, able to or lends itself to 
sustaining human habitation or economic life.184 The fact that an insular feature is currently 
uninhabited and has no economic life does not serve as proof that it is uninhabitable or incapable 
of sustaining an economic life.185 
However, the Tribunal noted that evidence of past habitation or economic life may be relevant in 
determining the capacity of an insular feature.186 An insular feature that is known and proximate 
to a populated land mass has always been uninhabited and never sustained an economic life, is 
likely to show that the feature is uninhabitable or incapable of sustaining economic life.187 On the 
other hand, historical evidence that humans inhabited an insular feature and that it was the 
location of economic activity would likely serve to show that the feature does, indeed, have the 
capacity to sustain human habitation and economic life.188  















In the view of the Tribunal, “sustain” is comprised of three pillars.189 The first pillar is the concept 
of the provision and support of essentials.190 The second pillar is a temporal concept. The support 
and provision of essentials must take place over an extended period of time and should not be 
short-lived or one-off.191 The third pillar is a qualitative concept, which entails that the support and 
provision of essential must at least be of a “proper standard”.192 
The Tribunal then went on to define what “sustain” means in the context of sustaining human 
habitation and economic life.193 In regard to sustaining human habitation, “sustain” must mean to 
provide the essentials to keep humans alive and healthy, over an extended period of time and 
according to a proper standard.194 In relation to sustaining economic life, “sustain” must mean to 
provide the essentials to continue an economic activity over an extended period of time in a 
manner that is feasible on an ongoing basis.195 
5.2.4 “Human habitation” 
In determining what is meant by human habitation, the Tribunal looked at the ordinary dictionary 
definition of the term.196 Human habitation is defined as the “action of dwelling in or inhabiting as 
a place of residence; occupancy by inhabitants” or “a settlement”.197 The Tribunal also referred to 
the dictionary definition of “inhabit”, which is to “dwell in, occupy as an abode, to live permanently 
or habitually in a region”.198 From these definitions, the Tribunal recognised that the use of the 
term “habitation” in Article 121(3) must incorporate a qualitative element.199 In the view of the 
Tribunal, the presence of a small group of people on an insular feature does not equate to 
permanent or habitual residence or habitation.200 The Tribunal noted that the term habitation must 
mean a non-transient presence of humans who reside on an insular feature in a settled fashion.201 
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Accordingly, human habitation requires the elements necessary to keep people alive on an insular 
feature.202 Additionally, the conditions on an insular feature must be sufficiently conducive for 
habitation and not just mere survival.203  
The Tribunal recognised that there are various forms of human habitation and no specific culture 
or sort of habitation should be assumed under an international instrument like the LOSC.204 
However, there are certain factors that are always constant when human habitation is 
concerned.205 The Tribunal determined that in order for an insular feature to sustain human 
habitation, it must at a minimum be able to maintain, support and provide drink, food and shelter 
to people so that they may reside there permanently or habitually for an extended time period.206  
Furthermore, it was noted that humans need company and community over an extended period 
of time.207 The Tribunal was of the view that “habitation” also implies that the insular feature must 
be inhabited by a group or community.208 Although Article 121(3) does not specify any specific 
number of people, the habitation of an insular feature by a sole person would not typically be 
considered human habitation in the ordinary sense.209  
5.2.5 “Or” 
The Tribunal was also tasked with determining whether the capacity to sustain “human habitation” 
and an “economic life of its own” are both necessary for an insular feature to obtain island status 
and generate an EEZ and continental shelf, or whether either of these criteria in isolation would 
suffice. The Tribunal first applied logic in its interpretation of Article 121(3) and found that formal 
logic would require that an insular feature that does not meet both criteria should be denied island 
status.210 This is because the text creates a cumulative requirement, that when coupled with the 
overall negative structure of Article 121(3) implies that the cumulative criteria detail the instances 
in which an insular feature will be denied island status.211 Thus, the Tribunal concluded that the 
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logical outcome would be that if an insular feature has the capacity to sustain human habitation 
or an economic life of its own, it will be considered a fully entitled island.212 
However, the Tribunal recognised that the application of formal logic to linguistic usage does not 
always result in the correct outcome. The Tribunal considered whether an implied second 
negation, omitted for the purposes of reducing the length of the cumbersome clause, existed upon 
a natural reading of the phrase - in simpler terms, “rocks which cannot sustain human habitation 
or [which cannot sustain] economic life of their own shall have no exclusive economic zone or 
continental shelf.”213 However, the Tribunal was of the opinion that this possibility was barred by 
the remainder of the Article. The Tribunal noticed that the same construction was employed in the 
second half of paragraph 3, where it is stated that rocks “shall have no exclusive economic zone 
or continental shelf.”214 The Tribunal noted that a logical construction in this regard must be 
unequivocally correct as the only possible interpretation of this phrase could be that a rock which 
does not meet the criteria set out in the paragraph “shall have no exclusive economic zone [and 
shall have no] continental shelf.”215 The Tribunal recognised that any alternative interpretation 
would result in such rocks generating an entitlement to either an exclusive economic zone or a 
continental shelf, but not both.216 This, in the view of the Tribunal results in an absurd outcome 
and is contrary to the intent of Article 121(3).217 
5.2.6 “Economic life of their own” 
The final textual element of Article 121(3) that the Tribunal explored was the term “economic life 
of their own”. The Tribunal determined that there are two elements of the phrase that require 
attention. The first element is the term economic life”.218 Second, the Tribunal recognised that the 
text does not only state that insular features must have an “economic life”, but also that they must 
have an economic life of “their own”.219  
In regard to the first element, the Tribunal looked at the ordinary meaning of the word “economic”. 
The Tribunal declared that “economic” relates to “the development and regulation of the material 
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resources of a community”.220 The term may also relate to a system by which goods and services 
are produced and exchanged.221 The Tribunal also realised that the word “life” implies that basic 
presence of resources is insufficient and that a certain form of human activity is necessary to 
develop, exploit and distribute these resources.222 Furthermore, the tribunal also made it clear 
that “economic life” must be coupled with the temporal component of ‘sustain”.223 Accordingly, a 
short-lived or one-off economic venture, in the view of the Tribunal, would not constitute a 
sustained economic life.224 Article 121(3) intends some form of continuous economic activity. The 
Tribunal also noted that although the drafters of Article 121(3) did not make reference to the value 
of the economic activity in question, a basic degree of viability for the economic activity is generally 
necessary for it to be sustained over an extended period.225 
The Tribunal recognised that the second element under consideration, “of their own” is crucial for 
a wholesome interpretation as it implies that an insular feature must have the capacity to 
independently support an economic life.226 Accordingly, the Tribunal found that the infusion of 
resources from the outside or activities based solely on extraction, without the infusion of the local 
population, would not constitute an economic life “of their own”.227 The Tribunal was of the view 
that in order for an economic activity to be classified as the economic life of an insular feature, 
the resources on which the economic activity centres must be local as opposed to imported and 
must also be to the benefit of the economic activity in question.228 Thus, any form of economic 
activity that relies on the injection of external resources for its continuation does not fall within the 
scope of “an economic life their own”. Economic activity of this kind would not constitute the insular 
feature’s own economic life, but rather an economic life which is reliant on outside support.229 In 
the same token, economic activity based purely on extraction and result in no benefit to the insular 
feature and its population do not represent the feature’s own economic life.230 
The Tribunal also, importantly, addressed the role of economic activity derived from an insular 
feature’s territorial sea, exclusive economic zone and continental shelf in endowing the feature 
                                                                 













with economic life.231 The Tribunal concluded that economic activity derived from the continental 
shelf and exclusive economic zone of an insular feature must be excluded.232 The Tribunal 
reasoned that Article 121(3) is about determining whether an insular feature will or will not be 
awarded an exclusive economic zone and continental shelf.233 Accordingly, if the presence of 
economic activity in the area which may possible constitute the insular feature’s exclusive 
economic zone and continental shelf was adequate to endow the feature with these zones, Article 
121(3) would be circular and absurd.234  
However, the Tribunal noted that a similar calculus is not applicable in regard to economic activity 
derived from a feature’s territorial sea.235 The same circularity resulting from economic activity 
derived from the exclusive economic zone and continental shelf would not result from economic 
activity derived from the territorial sea as all high-tide features, irrespective of their status under 
Article 121(3), automatically generate a territorial sea.236 Nonetheless, the Tribunal made it clear 
that Article 121(3) requires that the economic life be the insular feature’s own.237 In the view of 
the Tribunal, this means that there must be some link between the economic activity and the 
actual insular feature and not just its adjacent waters.238 As a result, economic activity derived 
from an insular feature’s territorial sea may constitute the economic life of the feature only if it is 
connected to the feature itself, be it via the local population or via other mediums.239 This means 
that the exploitation of the territorial sea by distant fishermen or extractive enterprises which 
operate in the territorial sea of an insular feature, but make no use of the actual feature, will not 
be sufficient in bestowing the insular feature with an economic life of its own.240  
5.3 The Context of Article 121(3) 
In exploring the context of Article 121(3), the Tribunal identified two aspects which required 
consideration. First, the Tribunal recognised that fully-entitled islands and rocks exist within a 
system of classifying other features, such as submerged features, islands, rocks and low-tide 
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elevations.241 Accordingly, Article 121(3) needs to be interpreted in light of the entirety of Article 
121 and Article 13, which concerns low-tide elevations.242 Second, the Tribunal identified that as 
Article 121(3) deals with the instances in which an insular feature will not generate an exclusive 
economic zone and continental shelf, Article 121(3) must therefore be interpreted in conjunction 
with the context of these maritime areas and with regard for the initial purpose for introducing the 
concept of the exclusive economic zone.243 
5.3.1 The Context of Islands, Rocks and Low-tide Elevations 
The Tribunal took a wholesome view of the status of insular features as below or above water as 
encapsulated in Articles 13 and 121 and recognised that both these Articles apply to a “naturally 
formed area of land”.244 The Tribunal was of the opinion that just as a low-tide elevation may not 
achieve island status through human effort, a rock may not be changed into a fully-entitled island 
via the process of land reclamation.245 Accordingly, the Tribunal held that the status of an insular 
feature must be assessed in relation to its natural condition.246 
The Tribunal found that not only does the aforementioned conclusion maintain the apparent 
structure across Articles 13 and 121, it is also consistent with purpose and object of Article 
121(3).247 The Tribunal noted that if States could transform a mere rock, incapable of sustaining 
human habitation and economic life, into a fully-fledged island by introducing technology and 
extraneous materials, the object of Article 121(3) as a clause of limitation would be thwarted.248 
This would result in a situation where the provision could no longer be employed as a practical 
restraint to impede States from laying claim to potentially vast maritime spaces. The Tribunal 
agreed with the position of the Philippines that allowing this would detrimentally reduce those 
areas reserved for the common heritage of mankind.249 If an insular feature’s ability to sustain 
human habitation and economic life could be determined by technological adjustments, “every 
high-tide feature, no matter . . . its natural conditions, could be converted into an island generating 
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a 200-mile entitlement if the State that claims it is willing to devote and regularly supply the 
resources necessary to sustain a human settlement.”250 
The Tribunal, accordingly, interpreted the term “cannot sustain” as “cannot, without artificial 
addition, sustain.”251 In the view of the Tribunal, this interpretation is aligned with the “naturally 
formed” limitation on the definition of an “island” and the phrase “of their own” which qualifies an 
“economic life”.252 
5.3.2 The Link Between Article 121(3) and the Purpose of the Exclusive Economic Zone 
Although the Tribunal analysed the textual elements of Article 121(3) in order to interpret the 
provision, it recognised that a basic textual analysis of the terms “human habitation” and “an 
economic life of its own” offered very little guidance in terms of the nature and scale of the activity 
that would be sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the Article.253 The Tribunal felt that the 
meaning of the text of Article 121(3) is, undoubtedly, influenced by its context within the LOSC 
and by the nexus between the provision and the reason for having an exclusive economic zone.254 
The Tribunal recognised that the 1958 Geneva Conventions limited the rights and jurisdiction of 
States to a territorial sea and continental shelf.255 It did not include any provisions that were similar 
to Article 121(3). This, in the view of the Tribunal, means that the genesis of Article 121 must have 
been a response to expanding State jurisdiction through the emergence of the concept of the 
exclusive economic zone.256 
The Tribunal identified that the purpose of the exclusive economic zone was to expand the 
jurisdiction of States in the waters adjacent to their coasts and to conserve the resources found 
in these waters in order to benefit the coastal State’s population.257 The Tribunal looked closely 
at various regional declarations258 made by proponents of expanded coastal State jurisdiction 
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prior to UNCLOS III and the positions taken by coastal States during the Seabed Committee 
negotiations and UNCLOS III259 in order to deduce aforementioned purpose for the genesis of the 
exclusive economic zone.260 
The Tribunal found, that like most of the provisions in the LOSC, the provisions regarding the 
exclusive economic zone were a compromise.261 These provisions had to strike a delicate balance 
between the interests of the populations of developing coastal States with the interests of 
traditional maritime States and States which boast long-range fishing industries and objected to 
the extension of coastal State jurisdiction. However, the initial impetus for extending coastal State 
jurisdiction in the first place was, undoubtedly, linked to the need of preserving marine resources 
for the benefit of the people of coastal States.262 Furthermore, the Tribunal identified that the 
Preamble to the LOSC places a particular emphasis on the needs of developing States.263 The 
Preamble to the LOSC states that the legal order for the oceans, which the LOSC seeks to 
achieve, would “contribute to the realization of a just and equitable international economic order 
which takes into account the interests and needs of mankind as a whole and, in particular, the 
special interests and needs of developing countries, whether coastal or land-locked.” 
In this regard, the Tribunal found that Article 121(3) was designed to act as counterpoint to the 
increasing jurisdiction of the exclusive economic zone in that it limits excessive expansion. 264 
Article 121 disables small insular features from inequitably and unfairly generating large 
entitlements to jurisdiction over marine space, that would accrue no benefit to the local population 
of the feature, but rather act as a windfall to the (potentially distant)  State to which the feature 
belongs.265  Accordingly, the Tribunal felt that any interpretation of Article 121(3) should act to 
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bolster, as opposed to counter, the purposes that the exclusive economic zone and Article 121(3) 
were designed to fulfill.266  
The best way to interpret Article 121(3) to achieve this outcome, in the view of the Tribunal, is to 
recognise the nexus between the criterion of “human habitation” and the coastal State’s 
population, for whom the resources in the exclusive economic zone are to be preserved.267 The 
Tribunal did however, note that preserving the resources in the exclusive economic zone for the 
local population of an insular feature is not the sole purpose for endowing the feature with an 
exclusive economic zone.268 However, without human habitation (or an economic life), the 
possibility of establishing a link between the insular feature and the people of the coastal State is 
significantly reduced.269  
Accordingly, the Tribunal concluded that the form of human habitation which the drafters of Article 
121(3) intended is the habitation by a percentage of the population for whose advantage the 
exclusive economic zone was introduced.270 Coupled with the notions of residence and settlement 
and the qualitative element inherent in the word habitation, human habitation for the purposes of 
Article 121(3) should be interpreted as habitation of an insular feature by a settled community or 
group for whom the feature serves as a home.  
5.4 The Drafting History of Article 121 
In interpreting Article 121(3), the Tribunal considered the circumstances that culminated in the 
adoption of Article 121. However, the Tribunal noted that the travaux préparatoires of Article 121 
are not a perfect guide for the interpretation of paragraph (3) of the Article.271 Critically, the 
fundamental compromise that resulted in the final formulation of Article 121(3) was achieved 
through a process of informal consultations in 1975, for which there are no records.272 
Nonetheless, the Tribunal was of the opinion that certain general conclusions can be extracted 
from the negotiating history of Article 121(3). These included: 
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First, the Tribunal identified Article 121(3) as a provision of limitation in that it imposes the criteria 
that disallow high-tide features from generating large maritime zones.273 These two conditions 
were introduced for the purpose of impeding coastal States’ jurisdiction over the international 
seabed which is reserved for the common heritage of mankind and the unequal division of 
maritime spaces.274 
Second, The Tribunal recognised that the elements of Article 121(3) were not considered in 
isolation, but rather were frequently considered in light of the context of other aspects of the 
LOSC.275 These aspects included: (a) the institution of the international seabed area for the 
common heritage of mankind276, (b) the institution of the exclusive economic zone277, (c) the object 
of the exclusive economic zone as a way to conserve marine resources for the benefit of the 
population of the coastal State278, (d) safeguarding the interests of archipelagic Sates279, (e) the 
issue of islands which fall under foreign domination/colonial dependence280, (f) growing concerns 
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over the potential use of artificial installations to generate maritime jurisdiction281, and (g) the role 
that islands play in maritime delimitation.282 
Third, the Tribunal recognised that the drafters of the LOSC accepted that high-tide features differ 
greatly in their size, composition, population, vegetation etc.283 In the past many States have 
identified criteria such as population size, surface area, and proximity to other land as useful in 
determining whether an insular feature should be endowed with fully-fledged island status. 
However, the Tribunal identified that that the negotiating history of the LOSC illustrates the 
inherent difficulties of setting bright-line rules for all scenarios.284 The negotiating history clearly 
shows that proposals to institute such specific criteria were continuously rejected.285 The Tribunal 
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found that in rejecting these attempts at precision, the drafters must clearly have preferred the 
dialect of compromise which is presented in Article 121(3).286 
The Tribunal also identified that attempts to categorise rocks and islands in relation to their size 
were all rejected during the negotiating history of Article 121.287 Accordingly, the Tribunal found 
that although the negotiating history evidences that there may be a correlation between size and 
the availability of food, water, living area, and resources to sustain an economic life; the size of 
an insular feature is not determinative of its status as a fully entitled island or rock.288 In the view 
of the Tribunal, size, on its own, is not a relevant factor in this regard.289 In reaching this 
conclusion, the Tribunal reiterated the findings of the International Court of Justice in Territorial 
and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), that found that “international law does not 
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Chapter 6  
Clarity at Last? 
6.1 Conclusions Drawn from State Practice and Rulings from International Courts and 
Tribunals 
From the above it is evident that drawing a distinction between islands and rocks in the context 
of Article 121(3) is an intricate task, fraught with hazards. It is impossible to objectively draw such 
a distinction on the basis of the text of Article 121 and its drafting history alone. In actuality, the 
drafting history of Article 121 does more to reveal the depth and scope of the differing views during 
the negotiations surrounding the regime of islands at UNCLOS III, rather than providing a useful 
guide for clearly interpreting the Article. It was apparent that States adopted vastly different views 
surrounding the issue of islands, undoubtedly based on their own national interests. As a result, 
States proposed substantively divergent and directly conflicting proposals, which reflected these 
often opposing and particular interests. These divergent views were, ultimately, accommodated 
in the compromise provision that was accepted as Article 121 of the LOSC. 
The key interpretational questions, especially relating to the distinction between islands within the 
context of Article 121(1) and rocks within the meaning of Article 121(3), remained unanswered 
and differing opinions lingered even though the textual elements of Article 121 and the associated 
drafting history was analysed. Indeed, it seems impossible to arrive at a definitive interpretation 
of Article 121 solely on the basis of textual analysis, even with reference to the relevant drafting 
history. However, this comes as no surprise as the regime of islands, as encapsulated in Article 
121, was undoubtedly drafted in an intentionally ambiguous and vague manner.291 
Certain limited guidance on the interpretation on the regime of islands can be gleamed from the 
history of international jurisprudence on the issue. However, it has been evidenced that that this 
experience is often unsatisfactory, to say the least. Indeed, past jurisprudence of international 
courts and tribunals has, unfortunately, done little to offer an authoritative interpretation of Article 
121. Such an interpretation remained lacking as international courts and tribunals have proven 
adept at effectively side-stepping the complex interpretational issues which riddle the regime of 
islands. Consequently, coastal States were still frequently confronted with challenging issues 
regarding islands. 
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However, the recent South China Sea Arbitration has marked a monumental shift in the trend of 
side-stepping the important interpretational issues that vex the regime of islands.  The Tribunal 
employed a three-pronged approach in interpreting Article 121, relying on an analysis of the 
textual elements of the Article; a consideration of the context, object and purpose of the Article; 
and an exploration of the drafting history of Article 121(3). The South China Sea Arbitration, thus, 
eradicates much of the lingering interpretational uncertainty that existed within the regime of 
islands. Accordingly, it is possible draw the following conclusions in relation to the interpretation 
of Article 121: 
First, the drafters’ use of the word “rock” in Article 121(3) is not intended to confine the provision 
to insular features made up of solid rock.292 As a result, the geomorphological and geological 
nature of a high-tide feature holds no relevance in relation to its classification in terms of Article 
121(3). 
Second, the status of an insular feature must be established solely on the basis of its natural 
capacity.293 External modifications or additions that are intended to increase an insular features 
ability to sustain human habitation or economic life of its own should not be considered when 
determining the status of the status of the feature in terms of Article 121.294 
Third, in regard to “human habitation”, the fundamental factor is the non-transient nature of the 
inhabitation.295 The inhabitants of the insular feature need to constitute the natural population of 
the feature, for whose advantage the resources within the exclusive economic zone need to be 
conserved and protected.296 Furthermore, the term “human habitation” must be interpreted as 
involving the inhabitation of the insular feature by a stable community of individuals for whom the 
insular feature is a home and on which they can remain for an extended period of time.297 A 
community of this sort does not necessarily have to be large, and a few family groups or 
individuals could well be sufficient to meet this requirement in remote atolls.298 Additionally, 
habitual or periodic residence on an insular feature by a nomadic group of people could suffice to 
constitute habitation.299 Indeed, the records of UNCLOS III exhibit a great deal of understanding 
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for the livelihoods of the people small island nations.300 In this regard, an indigenous population 
would certainly suffice, but it is also possible that a non-indigenous inhabitation could satisfy this 
criterion if the population truly has the intention to reside on the insular feature in question and 
make their lives there. 
Fourth, the term “economic life of their own” is inextricably connected to the criterion of human 
habitation.301 Ultimately, in most scenarios the two will go hand in hand. Article 121(3) does not 
make reference to a feature having economic value, but rather to its capacity to sustain “economic 
life”. This will ordinarily imply that the “economic life” intended by the drafters be the livelihoods 
of the human population which inhabits and makes their home on the insular feature. 302 
Furthermore, Article 121(3) makes it abundantly clear that the economic life in question must 
relate to the insular feature as “of its own”. Accordingly, the economic life referred to must be 
revolve around the feature itself.303 Economic activity that focusses entirely on the seabed or 
waters of the surrounding territorial sea will not suffice.304 Similarly, economic activity that 
depends entirely on external resources or economic activity that utilises the feature for extractive 
activities and fails to involve the local population will also fall short of evidencing a necessary link 
to the insular feature itself.305 Extractive economic activity that gathers the resources of an insular 
feature in order to benefit a population elsewhere would undoubtedly constitute the exploitation 
of resources for the purposes of economic gain, however, it cannot logically be considered to 
represent the features own economic life.306 
Fifth, the text of Article 121(3) must be viewed as disjunctive.307 As such, the ability to sustain 
either human habitation or an economic life of its own will be sufficient to endow an insular feature 
with an exclusive economic zone and continental shelf.308 In reality however, an insular feature 
will generally only possess an economic life of its own if there is a stable community that inhabits 
it.309 However, exceptions can be made for populations that utilize a network of related maritime 
feature in order to sustain themselves.310 In this context, insular features must be viewed in an 
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atomised manner. If a population is capable of inhabiting an area through the using multiple 
insular features it cannot be said that the population fails to inhabit a certain feature on the basis 
that this habitation is not sustained by one particular feature.311 Similarly, if a population’s 
economic life and livelihood spans a constellation of insular features, a certain feature in the 
constellation cannot be said to not possess and economic life of its own simply because it is not 
directly inhabited.312 
Sixth, Article 121(3) is only concerned with an insular feature’s capacity to sustain human 
habitation or an economic life of its own.313 The capacity of an insular feature is an objective 
criterion and does not depend on whether the feature is inhabited or home to economic life 
presently or has been in the past.314  
Seventh, an insular feature’s capacity to sustain human habitation or an economic life of its own 
is an assessment that needs to take place on a case-by-case basis.315 The drafters of the LOSC 
had the opportunity to institute any number of specific tests in this regard, but rejected precision 
in favour of the general formula seen in Article 121(3).316 However, certain key factors that are 
fundamental to the natural capacity of an insular feature can be identified. These factors include 
the presence of food, water and shelter in necessary quantities that would allow a population to 
live on an insular feature for an extended period of time.317 These factors will also need to be 
considered in conjunction with other conditions for developing an economic life on the insular 
feature in question, such as the proximity of the insular feature to other inhabited areas, the 
prevailing climate and the ability of the feature to sustain livelihoods.318 However, the weight 
afforded to these factors will vary on a case-by-case basis. For this reason it would not be wise 
to formulate an abstract test of the objective requirements needed to sustain habitation and 
economic life.319 This sentiment is bolstered in light of the fact the human habitation requires more 
than the basic survival of human on an insular feature and that economic life means more than 
just the mere presence of necessary resources.320  
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Eighth, the capacity of an insular feature must be analysed in light of the potential for a small 
cluster on insular features to sustain human habitation and economic life collectively.321 On one 
end of the spectrum, Article 121(3) requires that an insular feature itself sustains human habitation 
and economic life.322 This clearly excludes any dependence on an external supply and as such, 
if a feature is only capable of sustaining human habitation by way of the continuous delivery of 
resources from the outside it cannot be said to satisfy the requirements of Article 121(3).323 
Similarly, economic activity that hinges entirely on the provision of external resources or that 
constitutes extractive activity and fails to involve the local population of the feature cannot be 
considered the feature’s own economic life.324 However, on the opposite end of the spectrum, it 
must be borne in mind that remote island populations often utilise a group of islands, occasionally 
ranging over a significant distance, in order to sustain their livelihoods.325 In this context, any 
interpretation of Article 121(3) that seeks to analyse the capacity of each feature individually would 
not be aligned with the realities of remote island life or with suffic ient regard for the lifestyles of 
small island populations that was emphasized at UNCLOS III.326 Consequently, if an insular 
feature forms part of a web of features that collectively sustain human habitation and in a way 
that keeps the traditional lifestyle of the population in question, the role of multiple islands in this 
context will not be equated to an external supply.327 In the same vein, local use of proximate 
resources to sustain the livelihood of the population will not be equated to the arrival of dis tant 
economic interests targeted at the extraction of natural resources.328 
Ninth, evidence of objective, physical conditions on a certain insular feature will only be sufficient 
to help classify that feature if the feature clearly falls within one category or another.329 For 
example, if an insular feature is lacks vegetation, drinkable water and foodstuffs required for basic 
survival; it will be clear that the insular feature also does not have the capacity to sustain human 
habitation. On the other hand, an opposite conclusion can be drawn in cases where the physical 
characteristics of a large insular feature make it absolutely habitable.330 However, if the insular 
feature falls close to the line, evidence of such physical characteristics will be insufficient in 
                                                                 












classifying the feature.331 In these circumstances, it will be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to 
gauge purely from the physical conditions of the feature where the capacity to sustain human 
survival ends and the capacity to sustain the required form of settled habitation by a human 
population begins.332 As the relevant threshold often differs from one insular feature to another, 
the issues related to relying on objective, physical conditions for the classification of insular 
features is exacerbated.333  
In circumstances where an insular feature is close to the line, the most reliable evidence of a 
feature’s capacity will generally be the use to which it has historically been put.334 Human beings 
have exhibited extraordinary ingenuity in forming communities in extremely harsh conditions. If 
an insular feature has never been home to a stable community, a logical conclusion would be that 
the natural conditions on of the feature are not suited to the establishment of such a community 
and is incapable of sustaining human habitation in the context of Article 121(3).335 In these 
scenarios it must be borne in mind that human habitation can be ended or prevented by forces 
which are separate from the feature’s intrinsic capacity.336 Pollution, war and environmental 
damage are all forces that may lead to the depopulation of a feature that in its natural state has 
the capacity to sustain human habitation.337 However, in the absence of such forces, historical 
evidence that an insular feature has never sustained a stable community points towards the 
reasonable conclusion that the feature lacks the capacity to sustain human habitation.338  
On the other hand, if a feature is inhabited presently or has been inhabited in the past, it is 
necessary to consider whether there is any evidence that indicates that this habitation was only 
made possible through outside support.339 Links and trade with the outside world should not 
disqualify an insular feature in this regard, as long as they directly improve the quality of life of the 
feature’s inhabitants.340 However, if the outside support is so substantial that it forms a necessary 
requirement for the habitation of the feature, it cannot be said that the feature itself is capable of 
sustaining human habitation.341 In this context, an official or military population, which is serviced 














from the provision of outside resources, will not provide evidence that a feature has the capacity 
to sustain human habitation.342 It must be borne in mind that the object of Article 121(3) is to limit 
unfair and excessive claims by States and this purpose would be thwarted if a population was 
planted on an insular feature that, in its natural state, is incapable of sustaining human habitation 
for the sole purpose of claiming jurisdiction over the feature’s maritime zones.343 Accordingly, 
evidence of human habitation predating the institution of the exclusive economic zone may carry 
more significance than more recent evidence, if the latter is fogged by a noticeable attempt to 
stake a maritime jurisdictional claim.344  
The exact same mode of analysis must be employed when examining the current or past 
existence of economic life on an insular feature.345 It must first be considered whether an insular 
feature has historically sustained an economic life of its own before considering whether evidence 
suggests that the feature’s historical record does not fairly reflect the potential economic life that 
the feature is capable of sustaining in its natural condition.346 
However, the value of such a precedent is questionable.347 In a strict sense, arbitral or judicial 
decisions are only bind the parties to the specific case.348However, there can be no doubt that a 
decision of an ad hoc international arbitration tribunal of this kind is very influential as the written 
and oral pleadings which build up to the decision are saturated with past case references and 
judgements on the topic. In the context of the regime of islands, such rulings “carry special weight 
in international maritime boundary law” because of the “relative scarcity of authoritative 
pronouncements.”349  
The particular importance of decisions such as the South China Sea Arbitration can be attributed 
to two factors: first, the regime of islands constitutes “a unique line of jurisprudence” which stems 
from a continuous series of decisions and second, “the absence of clearer guidance from 
codification efforts, opinio juris and State practice.”350Although there exists no doctrine of stare 
decisis in the context of international adjudication, it would not be inaccurate to view decisions of 
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this kind as developing a common law in the classic sense.351 Accordingly, decisions from 
international courts and tribunals, such as the decision in the South China Sea Arbitration, are 
important for the purposes of comparison and will likely be attributed greater value as potential 
precedents. 352 As a result, it can be said that the international community is certainly moving 
towards clarity regarding Article 121 with particular reference to the distinction between rocks and 
islands. However, in light of the aforementioned concerns of the validity of the South China Sea 
Arbitration on the interpretation of Article 121, perhaps further potential sources of clarification in 
this regard should be explored. 
6.2 Potential Avenues for Further Clarification of Article 121 
As Article 121 of the LOSC has a direct impact of the maritime jurisdictional zones States can 
claim around insular features, it will also impact directly on the infringement of coastal State’s 
claims on the high seas and the Area.353 Consequently, it has been suggested that the 
International Seabed Authority (ISA), which acts as a representative of the international 
community’s interests in the Area, should play a role in the interpretation of Article 121 of the 
LOSC.354 This may seem like a very attractive option however, it is unlikely that all States will 
accept clarification of this sort.355 During the negotiations at UNCLOS III broad margin States, in 
particular, made constant objections to increased international control in regards to defining the 
limits of their continental shelves.356 In order to strike a compromise, the procedure involving the 
CLCS was formulated in Article 76 of the LOSC.357 It is highly unlikely that this compromise in the 
LOSC would be overhauled.358 Furthermore, opponents of bestowing a significant role to ISA in 
relation to the interpretation of Article 121 of the LOSC may argue that interest of the international 
community is already safeguarded by the CLCS procedure.359 
A further option would be hosting a diplomatic conference in order to clarify Article 121 through 
the elaboration of a more precise text.360 However, past experience illustrates that attempts at 
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precisely structuring the text of Article 121 were all rejected.361 Consequently, past experience 
with Article 121 at UNCLOS III points towards the futility of this approach.362 
Perhaps, a less ambitious approach may prove to be more realistic. The convening of a meeting 
of experts under the auspices of the Division of Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea (DOALOS) 
of the United Nations Secretariat could culminate in the adoption of a report which contains a 
fundamental guide to interpreting Article 121 of the LOSC.363 However, it seems that States are 
only really concerned with obtaining clarity regarding the interpretation of Article 121 when they 
themselves are involved in a dispute which calls for clarification of this sort. Most coastal States 
seem content to maintain the ambiguous status quo as this best suits their interests as it favors 
the possibility of claiming expansive maritime jurisdictional zones from insular features under their 
possession.  
In conclusion, although the South China Sea Arbitration has done much to clarify Article 121 of 
the LOSC with particular reference to the distinction between rocks and islands, the authoritative  
weight of the Award is questionable. It appears that State practice and international courts and 
tribunals will continue to be the key source for the establishment of a precise meaning of Article 
121 of the LOSC. It remains to be seen whether State practice will follow the interpretation offered 
in the South China Sea Arbitration or whether international courts and tribunals will affirm and 
build on it. This implies that although some clarity regarding the interpretation of Article 121, with 
particular reference to the distinction between rocks and islands, has been obtained; in all 
likelihood some uncertainties will persist. However, it can be expected that both State practice 
and international courts and tribunals will engage with this issue more meaningfully and more 
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